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Abstract: This paper provides evidence on the extent of Global Value Chain (GVC) participation 
by Africa as a region and for individual African countries. We find that Africa as a whole is 
heavily involved in GVCs, being more engaged in GVCs than many developing country regions 
as well as developed countries such as the USA. This overall finding hides the fact that much of 
Africa’s participation in GVCs is in upstream production, with African firms providing primary 
inputs to firms in countries further down the value chain. The possibility of upgrading within 
GVCs in Africa is likely to be limited therefore, something which the current analysis suggests. 
Despite this, we observe a great deal of heterogeneity in terms of GVC participation and 
upgrading across African countries, with a number of African countries participating in GVCs to 
a relatively large extent.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Declines in transport and communication costs combined with reductions in policy barriers to 
trade and international investment have led to a rapid expansion in trade and capital flows in 
recent decades. This process of globalisation has further engendered a shift in the way that goods 
and services are produced. Production is increasingly organised within Global Value Chains 
(GVCs), whereby a lead firm typically located in the developed world relies upon a complex 
network of suppliers from across the globe. Suppliers may simply supply intermediate goods that 
are put together in the lead firm’s home country, or may also put together the final good with the 
role of the lead firm limited to activities such as advertising, distribution and innovation. The 
expansion in world trade can be seen in Figure 1, which shows for the period 2000-2011 the 
value of world imports, with imports having increased year-on-year (except for 2009 following 
the economic crisis).1 This figure further highlights the importance of intermediate goods in total 
trade, with intermediate goods making up 62% of world imports in 2000, rising to 65% in 2011.  
 
Figure 1: Value of Imports by BEC Category, 2000-2011 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
Much of the debate on the effects of GVCs, and offshoring more broadly, has been centred on 
the implications for developed countries, and for workers in developed countries in particular. A 
now large literature considers the impact of offshoring relatively inefficient parts of production, 
                                                            
1 Related to the role and impact of GVCs, a number of studies have documented that one of the main reasons for 
the large drop in world trade during the crisis was due to a large drop in trade in intermediates (see for example 
Levchenko and Lewis, 2009).  
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that are often low-skilled labour intensive, to developing countries with low wages and abundant 
supplies of low-skilled labour. This literature suggests that offshoring can help explain the 
increasing skill premium (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1999) and the lower demand for labour (e.g. 
OECD, 2007) in developed countries, and can affect the vulnerability of workers by increasing 
the elasticity of labour demand (e.g. Senses, 2010). More recent work further suggests that 
offshoring may help explain the ‘hollowing out of the middle’ in terms of labour demand (e.g. 
Michaels et al, 2014) and that increased services offshoring can reduce manufacturing 
employment (e.g. Amiti and Wei, 2006; Winkler, 2009 and 2010). The literature looking at 
impacts in developing countries is much smaller, despite the fact that developing countries are 
important destinations for offshoring and are increasingly engaged in offshoring or outsourcing 
activities themselves.  
There are various potential advantages of offshoring and engagement in GVCs for the 
developing world, and for Africa in particular. A potential advantage is that developing countries 
no longer need to create entire industries in order to industrialise and be competitive in world 
markets (Baldwin, 2012). Instead, firms in developing countries can provide specific skills or 
products to GVCs. It is further possible for low-wage countries to produce – or at least 
construct – high-quality manufactured goods. Through participation in GVCs, and the exposure 
to international markets and foreign competitors, the potential for technology transfer and 
spillover effects arises. Such effects can take a number of forms, for example by providing access 
to best practice management and business methods, through the use of high quality and high-
tech intermediates, through developed country intellectual property and trademarks, through 
lead firm knowledge and technology sharing; through skills demand and upgrading, and through 
learning from customers. Such effects can impact upon local firms not engaged in GVCs as well 
as those that are involved in GVCs, with the development of a part of a GVC in a country 
potentially also leading to spin-off firms and industries. 
While potentially offering up new and more rapid opportunities to develop, a concern for 
developing countries that become integrated into GVCs is that such countries become trapped in 
low value-added segments of the GVC, where there is little possibility for innovation or 
technology transfer.2 As such, an important question is whether countries are able to upgrade 
within GVCs, which is usually taken to mean that countries – or firms within countries – are able 
to gain competitiveness in higher value-added processes and raise domestic labour productivity 
and skills. A further aspect related to upgrading that is relevant is whether GVC participation 
benefits the domestic society as a whole, through increased employment and wages, better living 
conditions, and economic security.  
In this paper we examine the extent of GVC participation by African countries and provide a 
comparison of Africa’s involvement in GVCs relative to other developed and developing 
regions. As such, the analysis is similar to other recent reports, such as that of UNCTAD (2013) 
and the African Economic Outlook (2014), which tend to show that GVCs are heavily 
                                                            
2 African Economic Outlook (2014) note that 61% of respondents to their country experts’ survey indicated that 
being locked into low value-added stages of GVCs was the greatest threat from GVC participation.  
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concentrated in the regional blocs of East Asia, Europe and North America (Baldwin, 2012) and 
that Africa captures a small but growing share of trade in GVCs.3 A starting point for this 
analysis is Figure 2 which shows the value of imports for nine different regions and indicates that 
Africa’s imports are dwarfed by those from other developing regions in Asia and Latin America, 
as well as by the developed USA, EU and Japan. The figure also reveals however that between 
2000 and 2010 imports in Africa have grown more rapidly (338%) from this low base than in any 
other region except transition countries (414%), which also began from a very low base. The 
share of intermediate imports in African countries (62%) didn’t change between 2000 and 2010 
however, with this share being below that in East Asia, Other Asia and Latin America in both 
periods, but above the values in the USA and the EU.  
 
Figure 2: Value of Imports by Region and BEC Category 2000 and 2010 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
The current paper complements the existing studies on Africa’s role in GVCs by further 
considering the extent of upgrading across African countries. To do this, we use detailed trade 
data to examine developments in the sophistication of exports, export unit values (capturing 
quality changes) and export market shares, further reporting information on product discovery 
(following Klinger and Lederman, 2006; Besedes and Prusa, 2006; and Cadot et al, 2011) as a 
measure of upgrading. Finally, we discuss the problems of linking GVCs to innovation in 
                                                            
3 African Economic Outlook (2014) for example states that Africa’s share in global trade in value-added grew from 
1.4% in 1995 to 2.2% in 2011, with UNCTAD (2013) showing that 85% of GVC trade takes place within the three 
regional blocs. 
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African countries, and provide descriptive evidence linking participation in GVCs to indicators 
of innovation at the firm-level in Africa. 
We find that Africa is heavily involved in GVCs, being more engaged in GVCs than many 
developing country regions and developed countries such as the USA. This overall finding hides 
the fact that much of Africa’s participation in GVCs is in upstream production, with firms in 
Africa providing primary products and simple manufactures to firms in countries further down 
the value chain. The expectation is that this kind of upstream production is likely to involve 
lower value-added activities, which unlike parts and components exports, for example, provide 
few opportunities for technology upgrading. Downstream participation in GVCs by Africa is 
found to be relatively low, and more importantly has shown little sign of increasing since 1995. 
Despite this, some African countries have been able to move into downstream production, with 
Mauritius, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania among other countries, reporting shares of 
downstream production in total GVC involvement of 50% or more in 2010. 
The paper is split into three main parts: Section 2 discusses the measurement of GVC 
involvement and reports a number of results comparing Africa with other regions and 
comparing individual African countries in terms of GVC involvement; Section 3 discusses and 
reports information on a number of measures intended to capture upgrading within GVCs; and 
Section 4 tackles the difficult task of linking GVC participation to innovation. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. AFRICA’S INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
2.1. MEASURING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
For some time now researchers have considered appropriate ways to measure the extent of 
GVCs and of individual country’s involvement in such chains, with the use of international 
Input-Output (IO) tables a common means of achieving this.4 A country’s exports (or final 
demand) can be split up into a component capturing domestically produced value-added and one 
capturing imported value-added that is incorporated into a country’s exports (final demand). A 
complete analysis of GVCs will also account for the fact that a country’s exports need not 
constitute final goods only, but may also be used as inputs into other country’s production (and 
exports).  
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) (HIY) developed the concept of foreign value-added in trade, 
which refers to the foreign value-added embodied in a country’s exports, with foreign value-
added being expressed as a percentage of gross exports. As discussed by Koopman et al (2011, 
2014), the original HIY measure was insufficient for a full analysis of GVCs. In particular, the 
original HIY measure required that imported intermediate inputs contain 100% foreign value-
added, implying that a country cannot receive intermediate imports that embody its own value-
                                                            
4 See Nomaler and Verspagen (2014) for a critique of the use of IO tables for measuring GVCs.  
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added. In addition, a country cannot import intermediate inputs, add value and then export the 
resulting good to be used as an intermediate input in another country’s production of final 
goods. Koopman et al (2011) developed alternative indicators of GVC participation that allow 
one to split up the foreign and domestic value-added content of exports, with the foreign value-
added share indicating the share of a country’s exports that consist of inputs that have been 
produced in other countries and thus do not add to the GDP of the country of interest.5 The 
approach of Koopman et al (2011) also allows one to calculate the share of a country’s value-
added exports embodied as intermediate inputs in other countries’ exports, what Koopman et al 
(2011) refer to as ‘indirect value-added exports’. Combined, these two measures provide a 
comprehensive description of GVC participation. The former indicates the extent to which a 
country’s exports comprise value-added created abroad, and thus captures the extent of GVC 
participation for downstream firms and industries, with the latter capturing the contribution of 
the domestic sector to the exports of other countries, thus indicating the extent of GVC 
participation for relatively upstream sectors that themselves have relatively fewer inputs from 
either domestic or foreign sources. 
The calculation of foreign value-added in trade requires a multi-region input-output (MRIO) 
table, which builds upon national IO tables by breaking down the use of products by origin. The 
rows in a MRIO table indicate the use of gross output from a particular industry in a particular 
country, and comprise two main components. The first is intermediate use, which provides 
information on intermediate use by both domestic industries and industries in other countries. 
The second is information on final demand, which is again split between demand for final goods 
from both domestic and foreign sources. The columns of the MRIO table provide information 
on the amounts of intermediates needed for the production of gross output. The column sum 
thus gives the sum of the domestic and foreign production of intermediates that are used in the 
production of output in a particular industry and country. Combining this sum with the sum of 
value-added generated in each industry and country gives the value of gross output. The 
information given by an MRIO table can be translated into standard IO matrix form by stacking 
all industries and countries, such that we have (݊ ൈ ݅) rows and columns, with ݊ being the 
number of countries and ݅ the number of industries. Gross output can then be expressed as: 
ݔ ൌ ܼ ൅ ݕ	
ݔ ൌ ܣݔ ൅ ݕ	
ሺܫ െ ܣሻݔ ൌ ݕ	
ݔ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣሻିଵݕ ൌ ܮݕ 
with ݔ being gross output, ܼ intermediate demand, ݕ final demand, ܫ the identity matrix, ܣ the 
technological coefficient matrix (i.e. the ratio of intermediate use to gross output by 
intermediate) and ܮ the Leontief inverse. To calculate trade in value-added we additionally 
                                                            
5 See also Johnson and Noguera (2012), Foster-McGregor and Stehrer (2013) and Timmer et al (2014). 
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require a row vector, ݒ, with each element representing the share of value-added per unit of 
output by country and industry, and a row vector, ݁, with each element reporting aggregate 
exports (i.e. sum of intermediate inputs exported abroad and exports of final goods) by country 
and industry. The trade in value-added matrix can then be written as: 
൭ ௩ܶ
ଵଵ … ௩ܶଵ௡⋮ ⋱ ⋮
௩ܶ௡ଵ … ௩ܶ௡௡
൱ ൌ ൭
ݒଵ 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 ݒ௡
൱൭
ܮଵଵ … ܮଵ௡
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
ܮ௡ଵ … ܮ௡௡
൱൭
݁ଵ 0 0
0 ⋱ 0
0 0 ݁௡
൱ 
with ݒ௡ being an ݅ ൈ 1 (diagonalised) row vector giving the value-added per unit of output for 
each industry in country ݊, ܮ௡௡ being the ݅ ൈ ݅ Leontief inverse for country ݊, and ݁௡ being the 
݅ ൈ 1 (diagonalised) row vector of total exports for each industry in country ݊.6 The first column 
of the trade in value-added matrix describes the value-added contained in the exports of country 
1, and can be split into a domestic and foreign component. The term ௩ܶଵଵ gives the domestic 
value-added content of exports. The term ௩ܶ
௝ଵ (݆ ് 1) gives the foreign value-added content of 
exports of country 1 generated by country ݆. Summing up these terms for all ݆, i.e. ∑ ௩ܶ௝ଵ௃௝ୀଶ , 
gives the total foreign value-added in the exports of country 1. The sum of the domestic and 
foreign value-added content of exports of country 1 is equal to total exports of country 1. Taking 
the ratios of ௩ܶଵଵ and ∑ ௩ܶ௝ଵ௃௝ୀଶ  to total exports then gives the share of exports of country 1 that 
are due to domestic (DVA) and foreign (FVA) value-added. An analogous interpretation holds 
for all other columns.  
We can also use this trade in value-added matrix to obtain information on the domestic value-
added that enters as an intermediate input in the value-added exported by other countries. This is 
found by looking at the rows, rather than the columns, of the ௩ܶ matrix. The term ௩ܶଵଶ for 
example, which can be written as ௩ܶଵଶ ൌ ݒଵܮଵଶ݁ଶ, indicates the value of country 2’s exports that 
depends on value-added from country 1. Summing along the row therefore (and excluding the 
diagonal term) provides an indicator of the value-added of a country that enters as an 
intermediate input into the value-added exported by all other countries. In the analysis below we 
again take this value as a ratio to total exports of a country, which we refer to as DVX. Finally, to 
capture the overall participation of countries and industries in GVCs we combine the FVA and 
DVX measures, by summing up the foreign value-added used in a country’s own exports and the 
value-added supplied to other countries’ exports, and taking the sum as a ratio to gross exports, 
i.e. ܩܸܥ ൌ ܨܸܣ ൅ ܦܸܺ.  
 
  
                                                            
6 Some recent studies replace the export vector with the vector of final demand (see for example, Timmer et al 
(2014) and Los et al (2015)). Doing this changes the relative importance of some sectors in our analysis (e.g. mining 
and quarrying become relatively less important in the case of Africa), but doesn’t affect the overall patterns found 
below. In Appendix C we briefly discuss the results when replacing the export vector with the final demand vector. 
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2.2. DATA 
The data used to construct our indicators of GVC participation come from UNCTAD’s Eora 
GVC database. The Eora dataset provides a MRIO table at the world level, with international IO 
tables reported for 187 countries over the period 1970-2011. The starting point in the 
construction of these data are national supply and use tables, or when not available national IO 
tables. These are then linked through international trade statistics. The database reports 
information on between 25 and 500 industries, depending on the country. In our analysis we use 
the 25 sector database over the period 1995-2010, using data in basic prices that reports 
consistent data at this level of aggregation for all 187 countries.7 For more information on the 
construction of this dataset see Lenzen et al (2013).  
 
2.3. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE ON GVC PARTICIPATION BY AFRICA 
2.3.1. Comparison of GVC Participation across Regions 
In this sub-section we use the 25 sector Eora database to provide a comparison of GVC 
involvement of Africa as a whole with other regions, beginning in Figure 3 with data for 1995, 
2000, 2005 and 2010 on overall participation in GVCs. A number of interesting facts emerge 
from this figure. The figure indicates that GVC participation has been increasing over time in 
most regions. The main exceptions to this are Central America and the Caribbean region where 
GVC participation has tended to decline somewhat. Overall however, GVC participation has 
increased, with the share of exports that are part of a multistage process increasing from around 
41% in 1995 to just shy of 50% in 2010. That the advanced countries – and the EU in particular8 
– are heavily integrated in GVCs is hardly surprising, while the evidence of intensive GVC 
participation of East and South-East Asia and to a lesser extent Western Asia is also in line with 
expectations.  
Turning to the situation in Africa we find that Africa has some of the highest rates of GVC 
participation, matching the levels found in Asia. In 1995, Africa’s GVC participation was around 
the average for all regions (at around 41%). The growth rate of GVC participation between 1995 
and 2010 in Africa has also been similar to that for all countries, with GVC participation 
increasing by 19.9% for Africa and 20.5% for all countries over the period 1995-2010. While this 
change in GVC participation was larger than that for developing countries as a whole (16.5%), it 
was lower than that for other developing regions, including South Asia (27%), West Asia (21%) 
and South America (21%), as well as the developed regions. 
 
  
                                                            
7 See Table A1 in the appendix for a list of the sectors. 
8 Note that we consider the individual countries of the particular region separately, meaning that the measures 
reported include intermediate flows between countries of the same region. This is likely to inflate the extent of GVC 
participation of the EU relative to other large single countries, such as the USA and Japan, for example. 
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Figure 3: GVC Participation by Region 
 
Notes: The GVC participation measure is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC 
database. Figures reported are the portion of a region’s exports that are part of a multi-stage trade process. Exports 
of a region included intra-region exports. This is calculated as the sum of foreign value-added used in a country’s 
own exports and the value-added supplied to other countries’ exports taken as a ratio to gross exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figures 4 and 5 split up total GVC participation into the foreign value-added component (FVA) 
and the value-added supplied to other countries’ exports component (DVX). The FVA measure 
will tend to be higher if a country or sector is involved in downstream production, with imports 
from other countries feeding into that country’s exports. Conversely, the DVX measure will tend 
to report higher numbers for countries and sectors involved in upstream production, with output 
and exports of that country feeding into the production and exports of downstream producers. 
Comparing these two measures thus provides evidence on where within a GVC a particular 
country or sector is. While upstream production is associated with the production of knowledge 
assets at the beginning of the production process, in a developing country context where rates of 
innovation are low it is more likely associated with the production of raw materials and other 
basic inputs to production, which may have little scope for upgrading (see Figure 14 below for 
evidence of this). 
Figure 4 reports similar results to Figure 3, but for the FVA measure. The figure again points to 
the conclusion that GVC involvement has tended to rise over time for all countries, though the 
increase has been largely driven by the advanced countries. Overall, GVC participation according 
to this measure increased by around 20% between 1995 and 2010 with large increases occurring 
in advanced countries (Japan (92%), USA (41%), and to a lesser extent the EU (28%)). For 
developing countries as a whole there was little change in the FVA measure between 1995 and 
2010, though relatively large increases were witnessed in South Asia (37%) and South America 
(18%). For most other developing regions a decline in FVA was observed between 1995 and 
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2010, with the largest declines being observed for the Caribbean (by 29%) and Africa and 
Central America (both by 8%).  
In terms of the levels of FVA, the initial values of the FVA measure were particularly large for 
East and South-East Asia, as well as Central America, the latter presumably due to interactions 
with the USA. In the case of Africa, the initial value of the FVA indicator was somewhat below 
the developing country average in 1995, being similar to values observed in West Asia and 
Transition countries, but higher than that in South Asia, and South America. The value of the 
FVA measure for Africa saw a decline between 1995 and 2000 however, with little change since. 
This outcome suggests that Africa – as well as most other developing regions – have struggled to 
become increasingly engaged in downstream production within GVCs.  
 
Figure 4: FVA by Region 
 
Notes: The FVA indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are the ratio of foreign value-added used in a region’s own exports to gross exports. Exports of a region 
include intra-region exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 5 reports similar figures for the DVX measure. The figure reveals that all regions 
observed an increase in the DVX measure between 1995 and 2010. In terms of the initial 1995 
value of the DVX measure we observe that Africa had the second highest share at 27%. Africa 
also had the largest increase in the DVX measure between 1995 and 2010, with the DVX 
measure increasing by 34.4% between those two years. Large increases also occurred East and 
South East Asia (33.9%), West Asia (32%), and Transition Countries (27%). In general, increases 
were much larger for developing countries (32% on average) than for developed countries 
(21%).  
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The large and increasing values for the DVX variable combined with the relatively small and 
stagnant values for the FVA variable in the case of Africa further reinforces the view that Africa 
has struggled and continues to struggle in breaking into downstream production and that much 
of its involvement in GVCs is in upstream (natural resource and simple manufacturing) 
production. Indeed if we consider the share of total GVC participation that is due to the DVX 
measure we find that this has increased from a share of 66% in 1995 to 74% in 2010, suggesting 
that the importance of upstream production has increased over time in Africa. 
 
Figure 5: DVX by Region 
 
Notes: The DVX indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are the ratio of the value-added supplied to other regions’ exports to gross exports. Exports include intra-
region exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
While the figures reported in figures 3-5 highlight the importance of GVCs in the case of Africa, 
by looking at the shares in total exports of foreign value-added and the value-added in other 
countries exports, the measures do not allow us to say anything about the actual volume of GVC 
trade. To shed some light on this, we report in figures 6 and 7 the value of foreign value-added 
and the value of exports of intermediates in value-added exports of other countries respectively 
for each of our regions and for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Both figures indicate that 
in terms of value Africa’s role in GVCs is very small, making up just 1% of foreign value-added 
(in all years) and between 2% (1995) and 3.2% (2010) of exports of other countries’ value-added 
exports. It should be borne in mind therefore that while the GVC ratios for Africa, reported 
above, tend to be relatively high, by considering the ratio of GVC involvement to total exports 
they may overemphasise Africa’s involvement in GVCs. 
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Figure 6: Foreign Value-added by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 7: Value of Exports in Other Countries’ Value-added Exports by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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FVA and DVX respectively for the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Figure 8 reveals a great deal 
of variation in GVC participation across African countries. Participation rates range from above 
50% in 1995 for Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Liberia, Algeria, Cape Verde, Botswana, and 
Guinea, to values around 25% for Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Uganda, and Senegal. The period 
between 1995 and 2010 witnessed some interesting changes in the extent of GVC participation 
across Africa, with the tendency being for GVC participation to increase. Declines in GVC 
participation between 1995 and 2010 were observed in just a handful of countries (Liberia, 
Botswana, Eritrea, Angola, and Togo), with the decline being relatively large in Liberia (9%). The 
increases were particularly large in Democratic Republic of the Congo (20%), Guinea (17%), 
Libya (17%), and Mauritania (15%), amongst others.  
 
Figure 8: GVC by African Country 
 
Notes: The GVC participation measure is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC 
database. Figures reported are for GVC participation, measured as the portion of a country’s exports that is part of a 
multi-stage trade process. This is calculated as the sum of foreign value-added used in a country’s own exports and 
the value-added supplied to other countries’ exports taken as a ratio to gross exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Considering the FVA measure (Figure 9) we observe relatively low values of FVA for many 
countries in 1995. For 11 countries the FVA measure was at 10% or below in 1995 and was less 
than 40% for all countries except Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe. Between 1995 and 
2010 we further witnessed declines in the FVA measure in a number of countries. In particular, 
we observe declines in this ratio for 22 of the 49 countries, with the declines being around 10% 
in Eritrea and Angola. Relatively large increases in the FVA ratio were observed in a small 
number of countries however, with increases of over 10 percentage points being observed in 
Lesotho, Tanzania and the Seychelles. 
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Turning to the DVX measure in Figure 10 we again find a great deal of heterogeneity in initial 
values of the DVX ratio, ranging from around 10% in Swaziland to around 43% in Guinea and 
Algeria. Changes in the DVX ratio between 1995 and 2010 tended to be positive however (the 
exceptions being Uganda, Botswana, Mauritius, Lesotho and Liberia). Increases of 10 percentage 
points or more were observed in a number of countries, namely, Libya, DR Congo, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Zimbabwe, and Morocco.  
 
Figure 9: FVA by African Country 
 
Notes: The FVA indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are for the FVA index, measured as the ratio of foreign value-added used in a country’s own exports to 
gross exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 10: DVX by African Country 
 
Notes: The DVX indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are for the DVX index, measured as the ratio of the value-added supplied to other countries’ exports to 
gross exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 11: FVA and DVX Share of GVC Participation by African Country in 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
Combined Figures 9 and 10 again point to the fact that, to the extent that they are engaged in 
GVCs, the majority of African countries are specialised in upstream production. There are 
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FVA and DVX in total GVC participation by African country in 2010. The figure indicates that 
in three countries (Swaziland, Lesotho and Mauritius) the share of FVA in overall GVC 
participation is above 70%. This suggests that a large proportion of the GVC involvement of 
these countries is in downstream production. For a further 10 countries this ratio is above 0.5, 
indicating that more than 50% of their GVC participation arises due to foreign value-added 
being incorporated in to their exports, and therefore an indicator of downstream production. In 
15 countries, the share of DVX in total GVC participation is 70% or above, with the share being 
above 50% in a further 21 countries. In these countries the largest share of GVC participation 
arises because of their exports being incorporated into the exports of other countries. This 
indicates that these countries are relatively highly specialised in upstream production within 
GVCs.  
Once again however, it needs to be remembered that the measures of GVCs constructed do not 
take into account the overall value of GVC trade. Figures 12 and 13 therefore report the value of 
foreign value-added and the value of intermediate exports in the value-added exports of other 
countries for each of the 49 African countries in our sample respectively for the years 1995, 
2000, 2005 and 2010. For the vast majority of African countries we see that the values of both 
foreign value-added and the value of intermediate exports in other countries’ value-added 
exports are very small, and are dwarfed by the values in South Africa. This is particularly the case 
for many of the countries that are ranked highly according to the ratios discussed above (e.g. Sao 
Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Liberia, and Cape Verde). There are however a number of other 
countries that report relatively high values in figures 12 and 13, including Algeria, Angola, Egypt, 
Libya, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia.  
Figure 12: Foreign Value-added by African Country 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 13: Value of Exports in Other Countries’ Value-added Exports by African Country 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Overall, the results for African countries suggest that (to the extent that they are engaged in trade 
in intermediates) many of them participate strongly in GVCs. At the same time, the majority of 
their participation is in upstream production. Such upstream production involves natural 
resource production and extraction as well as simple manufactures, where the possibility of 
upgrading is likely to be poor. To see this more clearly we report in Figure 14 the share of 
intermediate exports by BEC category. The data for this figure are taken from the UN 
COMTRADE database (see section 3.2 and Table A2 in the Appendix for more details), which 
reports data for 31 African countries in 2010. The countries are sorted in descending order by 
the share of intermediate exports that involve primary products (i.e. primary food and beverages, 
primary industrial supplies and primary fuels and lubricants). The figure reveals that in 15 of the 
31 countries, primary exports make up more than 50% of their total intermediate exports, with 
23 countries having a primary share above 25%. Many of the countries with the highest shares of 
primary products are involved in the export of primary fuels and lubricants (i.e. Libya, Congo, 
Nigeria, Cameroon and Algeria). Rwanda, Malawi, Botswana and Benin amongst others have 
large shares of industrial supplies in total intermediate exports, with primary food and beverages 
exports being relatively large in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, and in particular Burundi. In terms 
of the non-primary intermediate exports, processed food and beverages are relatively important 
in Gambia and Mauritius, while processed fuels and lubricants have a relatively large share in 
Algeria, Egypt and Mozambique. Processed industrial supplies tend to make up the lion’s share 
of (non-primary) intermediate exports in most countries however. This is a rather broad category 
that includes in addition to manufacturing goods, agricultural products and by-products, crude 
materials (such as rubber), textiles, cork and wood products, and leather products amongst 
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others. Many of these exports are likely to involve relatively simple manufacturing therefore. 
Perhaps the most telling observation from Figure 10 is that parts and accessories of capital goods 
and of transport equipment make up very small shares of total intermediate exports, with these 
shares being less than 10% for all but two countries (the average value being under 3% for all 
countries and just 1.6% when excluding Tunisia and Morocco). The two exceptions are Tunisia 
and Morocco, which report shares of these two categories of 22.9% and 23.7% respectively.9 In 
the case of Morocco the share of intermediate exports accounted by parts and accessories of 
transport equipment is 13.8%, with that of capital goods being 9.9%. The relatively large share 
for transport equipment reflects the role of Morocco as a hub for automobile production. This is 
also true to an extent for Tunisia, though in this case the share of intermediate exports 
accounted for by transport equipment (8.9%) is lower than that for capital goods (13.9%). 
 
Figure 14: Shares of Intermediate Exports by BEC Category in 2010 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
  
                                                            
9 Comparing Africa as a whole with other regions is equally telling. In 2010, Africa had a share of parts and 
accessories in total intermediate exports of just 3.3%, compared with 48.3% in East and South-East Asia. The 
figures for Transition countries (9.6%) and Latin America (11.6%) were still significantly larger than those in Africa. 
Conversely, the share of primary products in Africa was 62.8%, as opposed to 6.8% in East and South-East Asia, 
with Transition countries (55.1%) being the only other region with a share of primary exports in total intermediate 
exports of 50% or more. 
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2.3.3. The Sectoral Dimension of Global Value Chain Involvement 
Obtaining an understanding of the sectors in which countries are specialised within GVCs is an 
important step. For some African countries, there is evidence that they have been able to 
integrate downstream in the production network. Here the possibilities of upgrading are 
potentially stronger, though it is again important to understand the sectoral specialisation of their 
involvement in downstream production. Mauritius and Lesotho, for example, have well 
developed Export Processing Zones (EPZs) specialised in the production of textiles and apparel, 
which may limit the possibility of upgrading.  
In what follows, we examine in more detail the sectoral specialisation of Africa’s involvement in 
GVCs. In particular, we calculate the sectoral contributions to the measures of GVC 
participation described above for both regions and for the set of African countries. The sum 
across the sectors when considering the different regions therefore will be equal to the value of 
total GVC participation reported in Table 3. For purposes of presentation we begin by 
aggregating the 25 sectors into five categories (Primary; Low-Tech Manufacturing; High-Tech 
Manufacturing; Low-Tech Services; and High-Tech Services).10 Using this split we then consider 
the contribution of each of these aggregated sectors to involvement in GVCs as measured by the 
GVC, FVA and DVX measures described above. Figures 15-17 report this breakdown for 2010. 
Figure 15 reveals that there is a fairly even split in terms of the sectoral contributions to GVC 
participation for Africa, with the primary sector having a share of 26%, the two services 
categories around 20% each and the two manufacturing categories around 17% each. For most 
other regions however, the high-tech sectors contribute much more to overall GVC participation 
than for Africa. High-tech sectors contribute, on average, 58% of GVC participation in all 
countries, with the numbers being larger for developed countries (62%) as well as Central 
America (69%). Asia has a contribution of high-tech sectors to GVC that is around the average 
for all countries, though contributions in South and Western Asia lag behind those for East and 
South East Asia. The contribution of high-tech sectors to overall GVC participation in Africa is 
similar to those found in South Asia, Western Asia, the Caribbean, and Transition countries. The 
contribution of manufacturing to GVC participation in Africa (33%) trails behind all other 
regions, with the average for all countries being 66%, and with Western Asia and the Caribbean 
being the only other regions with shares below 40%. The share of services (41%) and primary 
sectors (26%) in GVC participation for Africa tend to be well above the average for all regions 
(26% and 8% respectively). 
Results when considering the sectoral contributions to FVA (Figure 16) are even more 
pronounced. The contribution of high tech sectors to FVA in Africa (34%) are well below the 
average for all countries (66%), with only the Caribbean and Transition countries reporting 
comparable numbers. While manufacturing makes a much bigger contribution to FVA in Africa 
than it did for GVC (60%), this is still considerably smaller than the average for all countries 
(88%) and is the smallest of all regions (with the Caribbean having a share of 62% and Transition 
                                                            
10 See Table A1 in the appendix for more information on how industries are categorised.  
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countries 73%). The contribution of primary sectors to FVA in Africa (27%) however, is much 
larger than that for all other regions, with an average for all countries of just 3%, and Transition 
and South American countries having the next largest contribution of primary sectors at just 
15%. Considering the contributions to DVX (Figure 17) we again find relatively small 
contributions of high-tech sectors (38% versus the overall average of 50%) and relatively large 
shares of primary sectors (25% versus an overall average of 13%). The contribution of 
manufacturing sectors to DVX are however more similar to other regions, with a value of 37% 
in Africa and 44% for all regions. 
 
Figure 15: GVC Participation of Regions by Sector Category, 2010 
 
Notes: The GVC participation measure is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC 
database. Figures reported are the portion of a region’s exports that are part of a multi-stage trade process. Exports 
of a region included intra-region exports. This is calculated as the sum of foreign value-added used in a country’s 
own exports and the value-added supplied to other countries’ exports taken as a ratio to gross exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 16: FVA Participation of Regions by Sector Category, 2010 
 
Notes: The FVA indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are the ratio of foreign value-added used in a region’s own exports to gross exports. Exports of a region 
include intra-region exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 17: DVX Participation of Regions by Sector Category, 2010 
 
Notes: The DVX indicator is constructed using the 25 sector version of the UNCTAD-Eora GVC database. Figures 
reported are the ratio of the value-added supplied to other regions’ exports to gross exports. Exports include intra-
region exports. 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figures 18-20 report the changes in GVC, FVA and DVX between 1995 and 2010 respectively, 
with the contributions of the five aggregated sectors also shown. The picture that emerges for 
Africa when looking at Figure 18 is that the increase in GVC participation has tended to occur in 
services (both low- and high-tech) and in primary sectors. The slight increase in the contribution 
of high-tech manufacturing is offset by a similar reduction in low-tech manufacturing. Overall 
however, roughly 50% of the increase in GVC participation in Africa has occurred through high-
tech sectors. This contribution tends to be lower than that observed in developed regions, but 
compares favourably with most of the other developing regions. Contributions of high-tech 
manufacturing to GVC increases in Africa lag behind developed countries, as well as South Asia, 
South America and Transition countries.  
The decline in the low-tech manufacturing contribution to GVC participation in Africa was 
driven by changes in its contribution to FVA (Figure 19), suggesting that Africa moved out of 
downstream GVC involvement in low-tech manufacturing. The relatively large increases and 
decreases in GVC participation due to high-tech manufacturing in other regions also tended to 
occur largely through FVA. The results on FVA have the further implication that the increased 
participation of Africa in GVCs through low- and high-tech services occurred largely through 
the DVX measure, which is confirmed by Figure 20. This suggests that much of Africa’s 
increased GVC participation has been due to African services firms’ involvement in upstream 
production. 
 
Figure 18: Change in GVC, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 19: Change in FVA, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 20: Change in DVX, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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relatively large increases between 1995 and 2010. Petroleum and Chemicals, Metal Products, 
Electrical Machinery, and Transport also contribute significantly to the value of GVC. When 
considering our measure of downstream GVC involvement (i.e. FVA) in Figure 22 we find 
somewhat different results. Financial Intermediation no longer makes an important contribution, 
though Mining and Quarrying continues to be important, along with Petroleum and Chemicals, 
Textiles and Apparel, Metal Products, and Electrical Machinery. The other notable observation 
from Figure 22 is that there have been few positive changes in the contributions of the different 
sectors to FVA over time, reaffirming earlier results that Africa has had difficulty in integrating 
into downstream production. Results for DVX (Figure 23) are largely similar to those for GVC, 
with Mining and Quarrying, and Financial Intermediation dominating. Significant contributions 
are again made by Petroleum and Chemicals, Metal Products, Electrical Machinery, and 
Transport, with Wholesale Trade, and Electricity, Gas and Water also reporting significant 
contributions.  
 
Figure 21: Sectoral Contribution to GVC for Africa 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 22: Sectoral Contribution to FVA for Africa 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 23: Sectoral Contribution to DVX for Africa 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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domestic and foreign value-added in exports in 2010 by sector. Figure 24 shows that in 1995 the 
value of exports in most sectors was relatively low, with Africa making up just 2.8% of world 
exports across all sectors on average in 1995 (ranging from 0.3% in Electrical Machinery and in 
Transport Equipment to 9.1% in Mining and Quarrying, and 11.3% for Private Households). 
Despite the figures above indicating a relatively high degree of GVC participation of Africa in a 
number of sectors therefore, it should be kept in mind that the actual value of GVC production 
and trade that Africa is involved in is relatively small and dwarfed by other regions. This is 
particularly the case for some sectors that reported relatively high rates of FVA or DVX, such as 
Transport Equipment, Metal Products, and Electrical Machinery. At the same time, we observe 
that many sectors have experienced relatively rapid growth in exports over the period 1995-
201011, with Mining and Quarrying showing the largest absolute increase. Many of the sectors 
that have shown the largest increases in exports are also those for which GVCs have increased 
the most, examples being Transport Equipment, Petroleum and Chemicals and Metal Products 
in the case of FVA, as well as Textiles and Apparel and Transport amongst others. Figure 25 
confirms that the vast majority of value-added in all sectors is domestic value-added, with 
significant foreign value-added only observed in a small number of sectors, most notably Mining 
and Quarrying and Petroleum and Chemicals.  
 
Table 24: Value of Exports by Sector for Africa in 1995 and 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Table 25: Share of Foreign and Domestic Value-added in African Exports by Sector, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
For Africa as a whole we further report in Figure 26 a split of total GVC into sectoral 
contributions and into the contribution of FVA and DVX within each sectoral contribution for 
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Figure 26: Shares of FVA and DVX in GVC by Sector, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
In order to present results for individual African countries we again aggregate the 29 sectors into 
the five categories used above and breakdown the overall values of FVA and DVX into the 
contribution of these five sector categories. Figure 27 reports the contribution of each of these 
five sector types to total FVA for each African country in 2010, with Figure 28 reporting the 
change in FVA between 1995 and 2010 and the sectoral contributions to these changes. Figure 
27 indicates that high-tech sectors tend to make relatively small contributions to FVA (the 
average across countries being 16%), with high-tech services contributing around 6% and high-
tech manufacturing around 18% of total FVA across countries. The major exceptions to these 
general results include Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia and Mali in the case of high-tech 
services (where the contribution is over 10% of the total) and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, 
Niger, Swaziland and Tunisia in the case of high-tech manufacturing (where high-tech 
manufacturing comprises more than 30% of total FVA). The share of high-tech sectors in FVA 
in is particularly low for Angola and Gabon, with a share of less than 10%. The primary share of 
FVA is around 30% on average, though with a great deal of dispersion around this average. A 
number of countries have shares of primary sectors in FVA of around 50% or more, including 
Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria, with others (Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, 
the Seychelles, and Swaziland) having shares below 5%. On average, low-tech manufacturing 
makes up the greatest share of FVA involvement in Africa at 41%, with low-tech services having 
an average contribution of 13%. Low-tech manufacturing is particularly relevant in Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia with shares above 50%, while the share 
of low-tech services is above 50% in Burundi, Chad, and Eritrea.  
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Figure 28 indicates that when increases in FVA occur, they are not usually driven by high-tech 
sectors (possible exceptions being Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, and Niger). Low-tech services are 
often found to be relevant in explaining the increases in FVA over time, with low-tech 
manufacturing being important in a number of cases (Lesotho, Madagascar, Seychelles and 
Tanzania). Low-tech manufacturing makes up a large share of the declines in FVA over time for 
a number of countries (Benin, Botswana, Eritrea, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zambia amongst 
many others), with primary products being important in some countries (Angola, Benin, Gabon, 
Liberia, Niger, Nigeria) and high-tech manufacturing in a smaller number of cases (Namibia, 
Swaziland). The contribution of services to FVA declines tends to be minimal (exceptions being 
Angola and Eritrea, where low-tech services made a significant contribution to the decline in 
FVA).  
 
Figure 27: Share of FVA by Sector Type for African Countries, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 28: Change in the Share of FVA by Sector Type for African Countries 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figures 29 and 30 report similar data to that in Figures 27 and 28, but for DVX rather than FVA. 
In terms of the share of DVX by sector in 2010, we observe much greater similarity across 
countries in terms of the contributions of the different sectors. Primary sectors tend to make up 
between 20% and 30% of DVX (25% on average), being somewhat larger for Guinea, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Togo, and somewhat lower for Botswana, Djibouti, Liberia, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Tunisia and Uganda. Low-tech and High-tech manufacturing account for 
respectively 10% and 9.5% of DVX on average, with significantly larger contributions of low-
tech manufacturing found in Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zambia, and significantly larger 
contributions of high-tech manufacturing found in Egypt, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia. This 
implies that, on average, the major contribution to DVX comes from low-tech (28%) and high-
tech (27.5%) services. Low-tech services are found to be particularly important in the cases of 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, and the Seychelles, with high-tech sectors being particularly 
relevant in Angola, Djibouti, Libya, and Lesotho. 
As we have already seen, changes in DVX between 1995 and 2010 tend to be positive, with one 
or two exceptions (Figure 30). In most countries where positive changes are observed, low- and 
high-tech services tend to account for the largest proportion of the change in DVX. The primary 
sectors make up a relatively large share of the changes in DVX in a number of countries, 
including the Gambia, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Somalia. Manufacturing generally contributes 
much less to the increase in DVX over time, though low-tech manufacturing makes up a sizeable 
portion of the increase in DVX for Cameroon and Mozambique, and high-tech manufacturing 
for Liberia, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia.  
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Foreign Direct Investment as a Source of GVC Participation – The Case of Morocco 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is seen by many as a prime means of a country engaging in GVCs. GVCs are usually 
coordinated by Transnational Corporations (TNCs), with cross-border trade of inputs and outputs taking place within 
their network of affiliates, contractual partners and arm’s-length suppliers (UNCTAD, 2013). Countries that have a higher 
presence of FDI therefore are likely to have a higher level of participation in GVCs, and may help generate spillovers to 
other domestic firms as well as through spin-offs.  
Moran (2014) discusses the role of FDI in the development of value chains within Morocco, an example of an African 
country involved in relatively downstream GVCs (see main text), and the factors that have encouraged FDI inflows. For 
many years, FDI inflows were around 1% of GDP and tended to be concentrated in low-skill, low-technology, low value-
added sectors. These flows rose in the 2000s to around 4% of GDP over the period 2003-2007. A number of factors have 
been important in encouraging FDI inflows. Despite the Arab Spring in the region, Morocco has remained politically and 
economically relatively stable, while macroeconomic conditions have generally been favourable. Morocco has also looked 
to strengthen its Investment Promotion activities, with a special mandate to seek out sophisticated investors. Efforts have 
also been made to upgrade the country’s infrastructure, for example through the renovation and expansion of port 
facilities in Tangiers. Such factors have encouraged Renault to set up production facilities in Morocco, taking advantage of 
the proximity of Morocco to major markets in Spain, Portugal and Italy. On the negative side, Morocco has restrictive 
labour market regulatory structures. There is no distinction between laying off and firing workers in Moroccan labour law, 
with a six month notice period and relatively large severance package in effect (equal to 85 weeks of salary on average). 
These labour market regulations are cited as a disincentive for investors to set up operations in Morocco, as well as 
hindering Moroccan firms from moving into the supply chains of foreign companies that do invest.  
The study of Moran also emphasises the role of good fortune in a country embedding itself in downstream production 
within GVCs. Morocco has developed a significant aerospace cluster around Casablanca, which arose due to the efforts of 
Seddik Belyamani, who was Boeing’s executive president for worldwide sales in Seattle (an outcome which also emphasises 
the potential importance of a country’s diaspora in developing GVC capabilities, and in particular a subset of influential 
diaspora). Creating a joint venture between Boeing and Royal Air Maroc, Belyamani and his counterpart in Royal Air 
Maroc, outsourced the production of parts to Morocco.  In order to develop and cement its place in the GVC of this 
sector, an Institute for Aeronautical Training was set up to ensure an adequate supply of well-trained employees. By 2013, 
Morocco’s aerospace exports exceeded $900 million. 
Moran, T.H., 2013. Foreign investment and supply chains in emerging markets: Recurring problems and demonstrated 
solutions. Working Paper no. 14/12, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington: DC.  
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Figure 29: Share of DVX by Sector Type for African Countries, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 30: Change in DVX by Sector Type for African Countries 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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knowledge and technology spillovers that can assist with technological upgrading is potentially 
greater, whereas if Africa’s involvement in GVCs revolves around a set of firms from Africa or 
other developing countries the extent of such diffusion may be limited. 
Figures 31-33 report the 2010 values of GVC, FVA and DVX respectively, but split up the 
overall values into the contributions of different regions. In the case of FVA and Africa for 
example, we split up Africa’s share of foreign value-added in total exports into the region of 
origin of the foreign value-added. In the case of DVX and Africa we split up Africa’s domestic 
value-added of intermediates inputs in the value-added of exports of other countries (in total 
exports of Africa) into the shares of Africa’s domestic value-added going to each of our nine 
regions. The figures reveal that the EU contributes a great deal to overall GVC participation of 
other regions, particularly for the EU itself, but also for transition countries and notably Africa. 
East and South Asia are relatively important in the values of GVCs for Asian countries in 
general, while the USA is the major contributor to GVC participation for Central America and 
the Caribbean. Such results are suggestive of the continuing importance of geographical 
proximity for trade more generally, and for GVC participation in particular. Africa generally 
contributes very little to the overall GVC participation rates of regions, including for Africa 
itself. The contribution of other African countries to GVC participation in Africa in 2010 was 
just 5%, with the share of Europe (58%) dominating. The only other region to contribute 
significantly to African GVC participation was East and South-East Asia (15%). A similar 
pattern is observed when considering the FVA measure (Figure 28), though there is a slightly 
higher contribution of Africa to FVA for other African countries (10%) and a slightly lower 
contribution from the EU (45%). Results for the DVX measure (Figure 29) also tend to report a 
similar pattern, with DVX following a geographical pattern to a large extent. One thing to note 
from Figure 33 is that East and South-East Asia tends to contribute significantly across most 
regions, confirming the role of this region as a region heavily involved in final assembly (i.e. 
other regions provide a relatively large share of their domestic value-added through intermediates 
to the exports of East and South East Asia).  
Figures 34-36 consider the developments in GVC, FVA and DVX participation by region over 
the period 1995-2010, with the contribution of each region to these changes highlighted. In the 
case of overall GVC participation (Figure 34) we see that the positive changes in GVC 
participation across regions are driven by the contributions of the EU and East and South-East 
Asia. What is also interesting in this figure is the negative contribution of the USA to changes in 
GVC participation across most regions, and particularly Latin America, with negative 
contributions of Japan also found across many regions. The EU and East and South-East Asia 
comprise the vast majority of the change in GVC participation for Africa, with these two regions 
making up 91% of the change (54% and 37% respectively). When we consider the change in 
FVA between 1995 and 2010 (Figure 35) we observe some interesting changes. While East and 
South-East Asia continue to make up a relatively large share of the positive changes in FVA 
across regions, the EU plays a much smaller role than for the change in GVC, often making a 
negative contribution. This is true for the case of Africa, where the EU makes a negative 
contribution to the change, leading to an overall negative change despite the positive 
35 
 
contribution of East and South-East Asia. This result implies that EU value-added in the exports 
of Africa has declined over time, perhaps suggesting that Africa is playing a relatively smaller role 
in assembly using EU intermediates. This may be the result of a switch by European firms to 
final production assembly elsewhere, most notably in other – perhaps new – EU members. That 
some of this decline has been offset by East and South-East Asia is suggestive of the role of 
firms in this region switching final assembly towards Africa. When considering the change in the 
DVX measure (Figure 36) we find results similar to those for the change in GVC, with the EU 
and East and South-East Asia dominating the positive changes in DVX over time. This is true 
for Africa, with the EU dominating the positive changes in DVX for this region. Such a result 
suggests that African value-added is increasingly embodied in the final exports of the EU (and to 
a lesser extent East and South-East Asia).  
 
Figure 31: GVC Participation in 2010 Split up by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 32: FVA Participation in 2010 Split up by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 33: DVX Participation in 2010 Split up by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
  
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Other Countries
Transition Countries
Latin America
Other Asia
East and South East Asia
Japan
USA
EU
Africa
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
Other Countries
Transition Countries
Latin America
Other Asia
East and South East Asia
Japan
USA
EU
Africa
37 
 
Figure 34: Change in GVC Participation, 1995-2010, Split up by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 35: Change in FVA Participation, 1995-2010, Split up by Region  
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Figure 36: Change in DVX Participation, 1995-2010, Split up by Region  
  
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
To shed more light on the case of Africa we further report a breakdown of FVA and DVX by 
region for each African country (figures 37 and 38 respectively). Figure 37 indicates that while 
other African countries are not important contributors to FVA for Africa as a whole, there are 
numerous exceptions. Other African countries contribute more than 50% of FVA in the case of 
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, 
these countries are situated in southern Africa, relatively distant from the EU that tends to 
contribute the greatest share to FVA across Africa. In other countries, the contribution of 
African countries to FVA is much lower, contributing less than 6% of FVA in Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia. The simple (unweighted) average contribution of 
East and South East Asia across African countries is 12.5%, but again there are wide disparities 
across countries, with contributions being above 20% in Lesotho (42%), Madagascar (24%) and 
Mauritius (26%).  
Turning to the DVX measure (Figure 38) we see the dominant role of the EU in the values of 
DVX for African countries. The unweighted average contribution of the EU to DVX across 
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and Zambia, and Transition countries in Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Lesotho, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone.  
 
Figure 37: FVA by African Country in 2010, Split by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure 38: DVX by African Country in 2010, Split by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
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Finally in this subsection, Figure 39 reports for Africa as a whole the share of GVC participation 
by partner region that is due to FVA and DVX. The figure reveals that in most cases, and for the 
EU, East and South East Asia and the USA in particular, DVX makes up the vast majority of 
total GVC participation. GVC participation with these regions therefore largely involves 
upstream production by African countries, with the provision of raw materials for producers in 
these relatively advanced regions being the major role of African countries in GVCs. Only in the 
case of Africa and Other Asia does FVA make up more than a 50% share of total GVC 
participation.  
 
Figure 39: Shares of FVA and DVX in GVC by Region, 2010 
  
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
2.3.5. Summary 
This section has presented comparative evidence of the importance of GVCs for Africa as a 
region, as well as evidence on the extent of GVCs for individual African countries. To 
summarise the major results from this section, we can state that: 
(i) Africa as a region is heavily involved in GVCs, and more so than many other 
developing regions. This hides the fact that much of the GVC involvement of Africa 
is in upstream production, and involves in particular, the supply of primary goods 
into production of final goods in other regions and countries. Downstream 
involvement in GVCs is relatively small, and has shown little sign of improving in the 
last 15 years. 
(ii) There is a great deal of heterogeneity in GVC involvement across African countries, 
with a number of relatively successful countries that are heavily involved in GVCs, 
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and with a relatively large share of their involvement being in downstream GVCs. It 
needs to be borne in mind however that the measures of GVC involvement 
considered may overemphasise the importance of GVC involvement, since they do 
not account for the actual volume of exports, which is shown to be relatively low for 
African countries. 
(iii) Manufacturing and high-tech sectors more generally are not usually a major 
contributor to GVC participation in African countries. While manufacturing tends to 
play a larger role in downstream involvement in GVCs, the primary sector still 
accounts for the largest part of downstream GVC involvement across African 
countries. Changes over time in GVC participation tend to be driven by primary and 
services sectors, with high-tech services being particularly relevant for many African 
countries. Much of the change in GVC participation over time is driven by upstream 
production, with evidence to suggest that low-tech manufacturing has become less 
important in downstream production for a number of African countries.  
(iv) Intra-African GVCs are not particularly important for most African countries, with a 
number of exceptions in southern Africa that are more distant from other regions. 
The EU tends to be the biggest GVC partner for Africa, with some evidence to 
suggest that the contributions of East and South-East Asia, and Transition countries 
are increasing.  
 
3. UPGRADING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
The analysis above has indicated that Africa participates intensively in GVCs, but that its 
participation tends to be largely upstream, with participation often limited to primary production 
where the possibilities for upgrading and spillovers may be lower. In this section we report 
information on a number of measures that look to capture the presence of upgrading in GVCs in 
African countries. Definitions and types of upgrading within GVCs vary, with Gibbon and 
Ponte (2005) arguing that upgrading involves producers moving up the value chain by shifting to 
more rewarding functional positions or by making products that have more value-added invested 
in them. Four types of upgrading are often distinguished (Humphrey, 2004), the four types 
being: (i) process upgrading, which involves increased productivity in existing activities within a 
GVC; (ii) product upgrading, which is the movement into higher value-added products within a 
GVC; (iii) functional upgrading, which involves the movement into more technologically 
sophisticated or more integrated aspects of a production process; and (iv) inter-sectoral or chain 
upgrading, which involves a movement into higher value-added supply chains. The measurement 
of these different aspects of upgrading is not straightforward, with most evidence coming from 
case studies. In our analysis we construct three alternative indicators, intended to capture one or 
more aspects of upgrading within GVCs. We begin by adopting the approach of Bernhardt and 
Milberg (2011) who capture upgrading by considering changes in export unit values and export 
market shares, before considering information on the sophistication of exports and product 
discovery. 
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3.1. METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1. Unit Value Ratios and Market Shares 
To capture the extent of upgrading in GVCs we begin by following an approach suggested by 
Bernhardt and Milberg (2011). They use detailed trade data to capture economic upgrading, by 
plotting the change in export unit values between two time periods against the change in export 
market share between two time periods by sector for a large sample of countries. Export unit 
values, as elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Li and Song, 2011), are used to capture the quality of 
exports, with higher quality exports being associated with technological upgrading. As discussed 
by Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) increased competitiveness is usually associated with lower costs 
and therefore lower unit values. Upgrading then rests upon higher export unit values and 
maintained international competitiveness. Export market shares are therefore used as an 
indicator of cost competitiveness. Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) thus define economic upgrading 
as having taken place if the following two dimensions exhibit positive values:  
1. The dynamics of international competitiveness of a certain sector, measured by the 
percentage change in world market shares between the beginning and the end of a 
decade. 
2. The dynamics of product value, measured by the percentage change of unit values 
between the beginning and the end of a decade. 
Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) complement the concept of economic upgrading with the concept 
of social upgrading. They define social upgrading as a process of improvement in the 
entitlements and rights of workers as social actors that improves the quality of their employment. 
Given limited data availability on aspects of rights of workers and labour standards, Bernhardt 
and Milberg (2011) define social upgrading to have occurred if there is a positive value along the 
following two dimensions: 
1. The percentage change in the number of employees in a given sector over a decade. 
2. The percentage change in the sectoral wage level – i.e. the annual wage per worker –  
over a decade.  
In our analysis, we consider both economic and social upgrading across different sectors for the 
set of regions used above and for the sample of individual African countries. We further 
consider overall upgrading as a combination of social upgrading and economic upgrading, for 
which we compare the (unweighted) mean of the two economic dimensions with the 
(unweighted) mean of the two social dimensions. 
We begin by calculating the change in unit value ratios at the 5-digit level of SITC Rev.3 and 
then aggregate to the sector- and country-level by taking the average across sectors for each 
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country (using export values as weights).12 To avoid yearly fluctuations in the trade data and to 
reduce the impact of outliers we calculate the percentage change in unit value ratios between two 
three-year periods. In particular, we make a comparison between unit value ratios for the periods 
2000-2002 and 2007-2009. Using a similar approach we calculate the change in the world export 
market share of each African country between each of these time periods. The dimensions of 
social upgrading are calculated at the sector level using combinations of 2-digit ISIC data on 
employment and wages. Region-level aggregates are calculated using the weighted mean of 
country-level results and using nominal GDP (in constant US Dollar) as weights. To lower the 
influence of extreme values at the beginning and end of the decade, we use the median of three 
consecutive years. In other words, we report the percentage change between the median of the 
first three years and the median of the last three years. If the value of the first year of the decade 
is missing, then we use the median of the second to fourth year instead.13 
 
3.1.2. The “Quality” of Diversification: Sophistication 
We complement the analysis further by considering a country’s export structure which might 
also be important from a growth perspective. Hausmann et al (2007) argue that what a country 
produces and exports may be an important determinant of growth. There are a number of 
economic arguments as to why this may be the case, such as learning-by-doing, which may be 
more rapid for some products than for others. Baldwin (2011) criticises this approach arguing 
that it does not take the global value chain importance into account. For a country however it is 
still important to ‘climb-up the ladder’ by shifting workers to higher productivity jobs and to 
benefit from learning-by-doing effects in the longer run, even though these might still be at the 
lower end of the global supply chain (see Stehrer and Wörz, 2009).  
Lall (2000) emphasises the relevance of the technological composition of a country’s export 
basket for industrial development. Having an export structure with a higher technological 
intensity offers better prospects for future growth, because high-technology products tend to 
grow faster in trade due to higher income elasticity, creation of new demand, faster substitution 
of older products, greater potential for further learning, and larger spillover effects. Having an 
export structure with a lower technological intensity implies facing slowly-growing markets, 
limited learning potential, smaller scope for technological upgrading, and fewer spillover effects. 
These countries provide greater openness to entry by competitors, which might in fact stimulate 
temporary rapid trade growth, but this will not create sustained growth. After the advantage of 
low technology is exploited, it becomes essential to move into activities with higher technological 
intensity.  
Although Lall’s concept of technology levels serves well for many purposes, it is a rather static 
concept and it is only defined for relatively aggregated product groups. Also, it might not capture 
all aspects of a product that eventually determine its success in global markets. For example, a 
                                                            
12 For consistency we aggregate up to the level of the Eora sectors used in Section 2. 
13 Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) use the mean of three years for the same reason. We used the median instead due 
to its higher robustness to individual outliers.  
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certain product might involve a low-technology production process but requires complex 
logistics to be successful in global markets. To capture all such direct and indirect aspects of 
products in a simple way, Hausmann et al (2007) and Lall, Weiss and Zhang (2006) propose the 
concept of “product sophistication”. Their central idea is to measure product sophistication by 
inspecting which products are exported by which countries and then classify a certain product as 
more sophisticated if its exporters have a high income per capita. Being exported by high-income 
countries implies that the production process of that industry exhibit characteristics that enable 
high-wage producers to compete in world markets. These characteristics include, inter alia, 
technology, infrastructure, natural resource availability, marketing and value chain management. 
Of particular interest to us are changes in this index for African countries, which will provide 
evidence of a move towards products that are exported by richer and more advanced countries. 
Formally, the sophistication index of a product is calculated by averaging the GDP per capita of 
those countries that export this product weighted by the exporters’ revealed comparative 
advantage in that product. The revealed comparative advantage of a product or industry ݅ of 
country ݊ is defined as the share of its exports in the country’s total exports, ݔ௜,௡ ݔ௡⁄ , relative to 
the share world exports of industry ݅ in world total exports, ݔ௜,௪ ݔ௪⁄ , hence 
 ܴܥܣ௜,௡ ൌ ݔ௜,௡ ݔ௡⁄ݔ௜,௪ ݔ௪⁄  (1) 
It follows that the sophistication index of product/industry ݅, is defined as  
 ܴܱܲܦ ௜ܻ ൌ ෍൫ܴܥܣ௜,௡ܩܦܲ݌݁ݎܥܽ݌௡൯
௡
෍൫ܴܥܣ௜,௡൯
௡
൘  (2) 
 
In addition to this product level sophistication measure, Hausmann et al (2007) introduce a 
country level sophistication measure in the form of a weighted average of all product level 
sophistication levels, where the weights are the products’ value shares in the country’s total 
exports14: 
 ܧܺܲ ௡ܻ ൌ ෍൬ݔ௜,௡ݔ௡ ܴܱܲܦ ௜ܻ൰௜
 (3) 
For the calculation of ܧܻܺܲ in (3), Hausmann et al (2007) use the average ܴܱܲܦܻ of three 
fixed years, namely those with the largest number of observations. One disadvantage of this 
approach, as discussed by McCann (2007), is that it fails to take account of changes in global 
trade patterns over time. More specifically, the ܧܻܺܲ in (3) captures how the composition of 
products has changed over time, while disregarding any change of the ܴܱܲܦܻ of products over 
time. McCann (2007) thus proposes to use each year’s ܴܱܲܦܻ values to calculate the same 
year’s ܧܻܺܲ values. This alternative measure, however, is likely to exhibit a tendency to grow 
over time by construction, because all ܴܱܲܦܻ values grow with GDP per capita growth if 
                                                            
14 Note that dividing by the sum of weights equals dividing by 1, hence the denominator is omitted. 
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export portfolios do not change drastically. In this regard, interpreting an individual country’s 
ܧܻܺܲ time series is not straightforward. In our analysis, we use the average of ܴܱܲܦܻ over the 
years 2008-2010.  
 
3.1.3. Product Discovery 
It is important to distinguish between whether diversification takes place within existing sectors 
or by introducing new sectors that have not been exported before and are discovered to be 
profitable. The term “discovery” in this context was used by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) to 
denote the production of a new good that does not necessarily stem from innovation but from 
entrepreneurial copying from abroad. This notion is particularly relevant in the context of 
developing countries, as entering new export lines within a given trade data nomenclature does 
not involve genuine innovation in the sense of creating a totally new product, because the 
nomenclature consists of known products. Hence, to start exporting in previously inactive 
product lines implies exporting a product that is probably already exported by another country. 
Still, such discoveries involve entrepreneurial risk and capabilities. In the context of GVCs, a 
movement into new product lines can indicate product, functional or intersectoral upgrading, 
though it should be borne in mind that discovery as defined below can occur in any sector and 
need not involve the discovery (or export) of more technologically advanced products. 
Several definitions of what constitutes a “discovery” have been suggested in the literature. We 
construct a “conservative” version that is similar to the one in Klinger and Lederman (2006), a 
“liberal” version that corresponds to the analysis of export spells by Besedes and Prusa (2006), 
and a “moderate” version as in Cadot et al (2011). The difference between these versions lies in 
the intensity and the length of the time window under consideration, with certain trade-offs 
between a short and a long time window. To illustrate these trade-offs, consider that a country 
exports a certain good only in the years ݐ and ݐ ൅ 2, but does not export that good in the year 
ݐ ൅ 1. On the one hand, if the notion of “discovery” should include short-term entrepreneurial 
trial and error, then such a situation corresponds to two discoveries. Also, depending on the 
aggregation level of export data, it is unknown to the researcher whether two exactly identical 
products got exported or two products that are different but similar. In the latter, more realistic 
case, two distinct entrepreneurial actions took place, providing further justification for defining 
them as two separate discoveries. On the other hand, if the notion of “discovery” should 
describe a successful long-term development of an export line, it is more meaningful to consider 
only goods that are exported above a certain threshold for several consecutive years. 
Aside from this conceptual trade-off, the quality of data should also be considered. If there is a 
gap in exports of a particular product line of just one year – like in the above example – then it is 
possible that this gap is due to non-reporting instead of non-exporting. The choice of export 
length therefore also corresponds to the choice of sensitivity against misreporting. As will be 
discussed in the data section further below, we treat missing entries as not-reported positive 
values only if the country has not reported any exports in a given year, otherwise we treat 
missing entries as zero exports. 
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For the conservative version, the number of product discoveries in a given country in the 2000s 
is defined as: 
 ܦ݅ݏܿଶ଴଴଴௦ ൌ෍ቄ1	if	ݔ௜ ൒ US$	10.000 if ݐ ൌ 2009, 2008, 2007 ∧ ݔ௜ ൌ 0 in ݐ ൌ 2000	0 otherwise௜
 (4) 
 
For the liberal version, a product discovery occurs if a product line is active in a given year but 
inactive in the preceding year. The number of product discoveries by country and year is thus 
defined as: 
 ܦ݅ݏܿ௧ ൌ ෍ቄ1 if ݔ௜ ൐ 0 in t ∧ ݔ௜ ൌ 0 in ݐ െ 10 otherwise௜
 (5) 
 
The moderate or intermediate version was introduced by Cadot et al (2011), who argue that a 
product discovery occurs if a country’s product line was not active in the two preceding years but 
active in the two following years, which corresponds to a five-year window. The number of 
product discoveries is thus defined as: 
 ܦ݅ݏܿ௧ ൌ ෍ቄ1	if	ݔ௜ ൐ 0 in ݐ, ݐ ൅ 1 ∧ ݔ௜ ൌ 0 in ݐ െ 1, ݐ െ 2	0 otherwise௜
 (6) 
  
3.2. DATA  
Export data are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database at the 5-digit level of the SITC 
Revision 3 classification. Information on the use of goods is added by applying the 5-digit SITC-
BEC-conversion table together with BEC groups of capital goods, intermediate goods and 
consumption goods (see appendix).15 Similarly, sectoral aggregates are calculated by applying the 
5-digit SITC-ISIC-conversion table and further aggregating by Eora sectors. 
The COMTRADE database contains a significant number of missing values on the product 
level, which are often likely to represent an export value of zero.16 If a country has reported any 
exports in a certain year, then all missing values of that country and year are therefore replaced 
by zero values. If, however, a country has not reported any exports in a certain year, then these 
missing values are rather likely due to non-reporting than to non-exporting. Our treatment of 
such non-reported values depends on the specific analysis. For measures of discovery events, the 
relevant information is whether a product was exported or not. We therefore maximise the 
number of useable observations by replacing these cases of missing values with linear 
                                                            
15 Conversion tables between SITC and ISIC only exist for the 5-digit level of SITC, which is our justification for 
using this level of disaggregation. If a 4-digit product does not have any 5-digit sub-division, we create an artificial 5-
digit product with the same content. 
16 Cadot et al (2007:6) state that UN COMTRADE “does not always report inactive export lines as zero lines, as 
national customs often omit those lines.”  
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interpolations from preceding and subsequent years.17 For all other measures, i.e. sophistication 
and economic upgrading, however, the particular level of exports matters a lot, and using 
interpolated data would thus affect the results by construction. We therefore abstain from any 
interpolation in the calculation of these measures these cases, and restrict the analysis to years for 
which reported data is available.  
Data on GDP are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators using 
constant 2000 US dollars, while the indicators of employment and wages are from UNIDO’s 
Industrial Development Statistics (INDSTAT4), which provides data on employment and wages 
according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system.  
 
3.3. RESULTS 
This section is split into four subsections. Section 3.3.1 reports results of the economic and 
social upgrading measures for geographical regions and for individual African countries; Section 
3.3.2 reports results from the export sophistication measures; Section 3.3.3 presents the results 
on product discovery; and Section 3.3.4 summarises the results on the different indicators of 
upgrading. 
3.3.1. Economic and Social Upgrading 
Economic and Social Upgrading by Region 
Figure 40 reports for each of 13 sectors for which trade data are available from UN 
COMTRADE the changes in market shares and unit values for each of the regions used in 
Section 2.3 during the 2000s, thus capturing economic upgrading.18 The initial thing to notice 
from this figure is that there is little evidence of product downgrading (indicated by being in the 
lower left quadrant) for any region. Only in the case of Japan in Education, Health and Other 
Services is there any evidence of product downgrading. There are also very few cases of regions 
being in the indeterminate case of having positive market share changes and negative unit value 
changes, with the USA in Education, Health and Other Services being one such case. There are 
numerous cases of the alternative indeterminate case of positive unit value changes and negative 
market share changes, with the USA, Japan (and Advanced Countries more generally) and the 
Caribbean often found to be in the upper left quadrant. For most regions and most sectors 
however, economic upgrading according to this measure is the norm.  
Across the different sectors we tend to see evidence of economic upgrading in Africa. 
Percentage changes in the two aspects of economic upgrading tend to be relatively large across a 
                                                            
17 For example, Slovenia did not report any trade data in the year 1994, but it did so in the years 1993 and 1995. 
Product line 72834 was positive in 1993 and 1995, hence we used a linear interpolation for the year 1994. Note that 
if that product line was zero in 1993 and 1995, this procedure would adequately insert a zero. Also note that we only 
interpolated, never extrapolated.  
18 Note that country coverage is generally not as complete when using the COMTRADE data when compared with 
the Eora data. It should also be borne in mind that export data are reported in current US Dollars. 
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broad range of sectors, being particularly large in Electrical and Machinery; Transport; and Other 
Manufacturing. 
 
Figure 40: Economic Upgrading by Region, 2000s 
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Figure 41 reports results for social upgrading for a smaller sample of eight sectors for which 
UNIDO’s INDSTAT4 reports data.19 The figure again reveals little evidence of downgrading, 
along the social dimension in this case, nor any indeterminate cases of increased employment but 
lower wages. There are a number of cases however of increased wages combined with reduced 
employment, with this being the norm in transition countries, and often the case in the EU and 
advanced countries overall. We find evidence of social upgrading for Africa in six of the eight 
sectors (Food and Beverages; Petroleum and Chemicals; Metal Products; Electrical and 
Machinery; Transport Equipment; and Other Manufacturing), though where evidence of social 
upgrading is found for Africa its extent tends to be lower than for other regions for which 
upgrading is also found. In general, the change in wages tends to dominate the change in 
employment for Africa, with the one slight exception being transport equipment. 
 
Figure 41: Social Upgrading by Region, 2000s 
                                                            
19 Country samples are again considerably smaller than those available from the Eora dataset, and indeed the 
COMTRADE database. 
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Economic and Social Upgrading by African Country 
Figure 42 reports the extent of economic upgrading during the 2000s across the 13 sectors for 
individual African countries. Due to issues of data availability we only have detailed trade data 
for around 20 African countries (depending on the sector). The first thing to note from Figure 
42 is that there is little evidence of economic downgrading across the different sectors. Despite 
this general statement there are individual occurrences of downgrading, for example, the Gambia 
in Agriculture, Burundi in Fishing, Ethiopia in Mining and Quarrying, Niger in Food and 
Beverages, Algeria in Textiles and Apparel, and Zambia in Wood and Paper. Evidence of 
economic upgrading tends to be a common outcome across all sectors, with Fishing, Mining and 
Quarrying, and Electricity, Gas and Water (where data are scarce) being the major exceptions. In 
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the indeterminate cases (upper-left and lower-right quadrants) we find across sectors that 
countries tend to be concentrated in the upper-left quadrants, indicating that they have been able 
to increase the unit values of their exported products, but at the expense of a declining market 
share. Only in a few cases do we observe increased market share and reduced unit values, 
examples being Uganda in Fishing, Malawi in Mining and Quarrying, Benin in Transport 
Equipment, and Malawi, Namibia and Uganda in Education, Health and Other Services. 
Figure 42: Economic Upgrading by African Country, 2000s 
Note: Zambia with a unit value change of 6,363% and market share 
change of 307% is dropped from this figure 
Note: Ethiopia with a unit value change of 2,215% and a market share 
change of 12% is dropped from this figure 
Note: Burundi with a market share change of 8,967% and no 
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information on the unit value change is dropped from this figure 
Note: Botswana with a market share change of 96% and a unit value 
change of 6,515%, and Niger with a market share change of 1,703% 
and a unit value change of 139% are dropped from this figure 
Note: Burundi with a market share change of 6,537% and a unit value 
change of 689%, and Kenya with a market share change of 258% and 
a unit value change of 17,347% are dropped from this figure 
Note: Botswana with a market share change of 58% and a unit value 
change of 11,788%, Kenya with a market share change of 184% and a 
unit value change of 10,965%, Ethiopia with a market share change of 
23,805% and no information on the unit value change, and Burundi 
with a market share change of 13,694% and no information on the 
unit value change are dropped from this figure 
Note: Algeria with a market share change of 86% and a unit value 
change of 2,089%, Ethiopia with a market share change of 5,227% and 
a unit value change of 415%, and Burundi with a market share change 
of 18,961% no information on the unit value change are dropped from 
this figure 
Note: Kenya with a market share change of 104,289% and no 
information on the unit value change, and South Africa with a market 
share change of 30,411% and a unit value change of 582% are dropped 
from this figure  
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Note: Ethiopia with a market share change of 8,699% and no unit 
value change is dropped from this figure 
 
Data on employment and wages for individual African countries from UNIDO’s INDSTAT is 
scarcer still. Despite this, Figure 43 reports evidence for social upgrading for the handful of 
countries for which we have data. The figure indicates that there tends to be no evidence of 
social downgrading, with social upgrading tending to be the norm (the exception being Eritrea in 
Metal Products and Electrical and Machinery where social downgrading is found to occur). In 
some sectors (for example, Textiles and Apparel, and to some extent Petroleum and Chemicals) 
we observe in a majority of countries that real wages have risen at the cost of reduced 
employment. Only in the case of Lesotho in Petroleum and Chemicals, do we observe increased 
employment combined with lower real wages. 
 
Figure 43: Social Upgrading by African Country, 2000s 
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Case Study Evidence on GVCs and Social Upgrading in Africa 
A good deal of case study evidence has amassed examining the impact of GVCs on economic and social upgrading. Rossi 
(2013) for example considers the impact of GVC participation on social upgrading in the case of the Moroccan garment 
industry. She is interested in two categories of social upgrading, both of which are related to the attainment of rights and 
decent working conditions for workers. The first are measurable standards and include factors such as wages, physical 
wellbeing (e.g. health and safety, working environment, and working hours), and employment security (e.g. contract type, 
and social protection). The second are enabling rights, which are less easy to measure, and include factors such as the 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, the right to freely choose employment, non-discrimination, and voice. 
Rossi links three types of economic upgrading within GVCs to the measures of social upgrading. The types of economic 
upgrading are: (i) process upgrading that increases the efficiency of the production process; (ii) product upgrading that 
involves a change in the type of product produced; and (iii) functional upgrading, which involves a change in the mix of 
activities performed by the firm. It is this latter form that involves a move to a more technologically advanced chain, 
considered the key step in moving towards higher value-added activities. In the case of garment production functional 
upgrading is considered to be a move from assembly to ‘full package’ production 
Morocco has become an important garment supplier to the EU, with 89.3% of garment production in Morocco aimed at 
the export market (and 90% of this to the EU) over the period 2003-2007, and with garment exports comprising 23.2% of 
manufacturing exports. In 2011, there were around 1,600 garment manufacturers in Morocco, employing around 175,000 
workers, many of whom were women and young unskilled workers. Garment producers in Morocco have become 
increasingly engaged in the fast fashion segment of the market, which is characterised by a high responsiveness to the 
latest fashion trends and customer demands, relatively high quality, and low cost. As discussed by Rossi, this shift adds 
additional pressure on suppliers in terms of flexibility, low cost, short lead times, and high quality and productivity. 
One of the main results of Rossi’s study was that economic upgrading, particularly in the fast fashion sector, led to the 
emergence of parallel workforces within the same factory. Regular workers tended to be higher skilled and usually senior 
workers that had been in the factory for some time, and tended to ensure the quality and stability of production, while 
irregular workers tended to be younger and low-skilled, with a role of acting as a buffer for uncertainty in production. This 
outcome of a dual labour force is not uncommon in the GVC literature, and it usually linked to the exploitation of cheap 
labour and to the increased vulnerability and insecurity of certain categories of workers (e.g. women, migrant and contract 
workers). Rossi further finds that the extent of social upgrading differs between these two groups of workers.  
Process upgrading was found to be widespread across the different firms, often achieved through production 
rationalisation, improved work organisation, and higher labour productivity. Process upgrading was further found to have 
an important impact on social upgrading through overtime, with excessive working hours being reduced, and through 
improved health and safety standards. At the same time, process upgrading was sometimes associated with reduced 
employment, an outcome that impacted upon the low-skilled workers in particular, that were dismissed in favour of fewer 
workers able to adapt to different production functions.  
Product upgrading generally took two forms: (i) a shift to producing a wide range of products at short notice; and (ii) a 
shift towards highly specialised production for the high-end luxury brands. This latter form of product upgrading can lead 
to increased wages, as well as additional positive benefits if the new products require new skills and technologies. This was 
not a general outcome however, with many firms starting to supply for luxury brands, but not observing any changes in 
terms of skill or social upgrading.  
Finally, in terms of functional upgrading all firms were engaged in some form of ‘full package’ sub-contracting, with those 
that were most successful enjoying higher profit margins and able to hold off competition from lower-cost neighbouring 
countries. Functional upgrading requires a higher level of skills in the labour force, and hence an investment in training 
and payment of higher wages to qualified workers. At the same time, the complexity of the services offered, along with the 
required speed and flexibility of production pose additional problems and lead to fluctuations in workforce according to 
order status. It is these problems that lead to the development of a dual workforce, with the regular workers being 
permanently hired and which have higher skills able to provide high quality products and take on new tasks when needed, 
and lower skilled younger workers employed on worse terms as irregular workers. These latter workers are found to be 
discriminated against with regard to wages, benefits, hours of work and general work conditions.  
Functional upgrading has a mixed impact on social upgrading as it leads to different treatment for regular and irregular 
workers, with respect to contracting arrangements, wage payments and enforcement of correct recording of overtime 
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hours. Functional upgrading also impacts on other measurable conditions for these two groups, with irregular workers not 
benefitting from any training and not having opportunities for skill upgrading. This had further knock-on effects with such 
workers not having access to wage bonuses and not building up the experience to allow them to bargain more effectively 
in their current or another factory, leading to little hope of obtaining regular employment. In terms of enabling rights, 
regular workers gain a higher degree of respect within factories and are engaged in a constructive dialogue with 
management. Irregular workers however are often subject to discrimination because their work is not considered equally 
important. Irregular workers tend not to have a voice and many complain of harsh treatment by their supervisors 
Ross, A., 2013. Does economic upgrading lead to social upgrading in global production networks? Evidence from 
Morocco. World Development, 46, 223-233. 
 
3.3.2. The Sophistication of Exports 
Figure 44 shows the expected – and indeed implied – outcome that the values of EXPY are 
higher for more developed and richer regions than for the lesser developed poorer regions. 
Africa had the second lowest (ahead of the Caribbean) value of EXPY in 1995 reflecting the fact 
that it is heavily specialised in exports that are not exported by richer regions. Africa has shown a 
dramatic increase in EXPY however, with the value increasing by around 50% between 1995 and 
2000. While much of this increase is due to data being available for additional African countries 
in 2000 (see Figure 41 below), there was a general tendency for EXPY to increase for those 
countries for which data was available in 1995, suggesting that this increase is also due to a 
movement towards more sophisticated exports, or more precisely towards exports that are more 
intensively exported by richer countries. In 2000, the value of EXPY in Africa had risen to such 
an extent that it matched the values in South Asia, remaining somewhat below the values in 
South America and Transition countries. Since 2000 however there has been a slight decrease in 
the value of EXPY for Africa, while the value in South Asia has continued to grow relatively 
rapidly. Despite similar stalls in the development of EXPY in South America and Transition 
countries, the value of EXPY in Africa continued to be the lowest of all regions.    
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Figure 44: EXPY by Region 
 
Considering results by African country (Figure 45), we find relatively large values (10,000 or 
above) of EXPY for Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia in 2010. The value 
of EXPY is below 5,000 in a number of countries however, including Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, and 
Zimbabwe. Of perhaps more interest than the levels are the changes in the values of EXPY. For 
some countries we observe steady increases in the value of EXPY over time. For Madagascar, 
Malawi, and Tunisia, for example, we observe increases in EXPY from 1995 to 2000 and from 
2000 to 2010. In 16 other countries we observe increases from 2000 to 2010, with little change 
observed in another three countries. The increases are relatively large for Benin, Madagascar, 
Senegal and Tunisia. We observe a number of negative changes in EXPY between 2000 and 
2010 however. In particular, there are nine countries for which EXPY declines, with the declines 
being particularly pronounced in Mauritania, Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
Overall therefore, the results from the export sophistication measure provide mixed results. 
While developments for Africa as a whole have tended to be positive, Africa remains the region 
with the lowest values of this export sophistication index. Within Africa there have been a 
number of relative successes in terms of export sophistication development (examples being 
Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius and Tunisia), but a significant number of cases where export 
sophistication has regressed (the most notable examples being Mauritania, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe). 
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Figure 45: EXPY by African Country 
 
3.3.3. Product Discovery 
In this section we report results on the indicators of product discovery described above. In the 
main text we concentrate on the conservative measure of product discovery, with results from 
the liberal and intermediate cases relegated to Appendix B. Figure 46 reports results for the 
conservative measure of product discovery (see equations (4) and (5) above). Concentrating on 
the 2000s for which the trade data is more complete, we see a great deal of heterogeneity in 
product discovery. Rates tend to be relatively low for advanced regions, particularly the US. 
South and West Asia have the highest rates, followed by South and Central America. Africa has a 
rate of product discovery that is slightly below the average for developing countries, at a rate 
similar to transition countries. Figure 47 then splits up the information on product discovery by 
BEC code. Results for the USA stand out, with all product discoveries in the 2000s found to be 
in intermediate goods. Shares of intermediate goods in product discovery tend to be relatively 
high for advanced countries in general, with shares for Africa being somewhat lower than for 
developing countries as a whole. In the 2000s, consumption goods tended to make up a large 
share of product discovery in Africa, relative to other regions.  
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Figure 46: Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Conservative Measure) 
 
 
Figure 47: Types of Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Conservative Measure) 
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Figure 48: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Conservative Measure) 
 
Considering individual African countries (Figure 48), we find the highest rates of product 
discovery in Egypt, Uganda, Tunisia, Eritrea, Kenya and Nigeria, with Zambia, Senegal and 
Morocco also reporting above average (for Africa) rates of product discovery. Figure 49 reports 
information on the share of product discovery by product type for the 2000s. Intermediates are 
found to make up the greatest share of product discovery across most countries, with the shares 
being particularly high for the Gambia, Mauritania, South Africa and Zimbabwe amongst others. 
Shares of intermediates are much lower (less than 50%) in other countries such as Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar and Togo. Consumption goods discoveries tend to be relatively 
important in countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo, Ethiopia and Niger, with capital goods 
discoveries being relatively important in Burundi, Kenya and Madagascar. 
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Figure 49: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Conservative Measure) 
 
 
3.3.4. Summary 
This section has presented results from a number of alternative indicators that are intended to 
capture upgrading. Given the variety of measures considered and the sectoral nature of some of 
these measures, it is both difficult to compare results across the different measures or draw firm 
conclusions on the existence of upgrading for specific African countries. Summarising however, 
the results in this section suggest the following:  
(i) Despite a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity there is little evidence of economic 
downgrading at the sectoral level using the approach of Bernhardt and Milberg (2011), with 
economic upgrading tending to be prevalent. Where economic upgrading is not present we tend 
to observe increased unit value ratios combined with reduced market shares, suggesting that 
increased prices result in a loss of competitiveness (possibly implying that increased prices are 
not the result of improved quality). 
(ii) Similar results hold for social upgrading, with social upgrading being the more normal 
outcome. While a small number of cases of social downgrading are present, a lack of social 
upgrading more usually arises as a combination of increased wages but reduced employment. 
(iii) Levels of export sophistication do not reach the levels in advanced countries for any country 
in Africa, though levels reported for a number of African countries are around the average for 
the sample of developing countries (e.g. Algeria and South Africa). The majority of African 
countries however, report values of export sophistication that are somewhat below the 
developing country average (of around 14,000), with values being below 5,000 for 12 of the 32 
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countries for which data are available. The change in export sophistication has also tended to 
grow relatively slowly for most countries between 2000 and 2010, with declines in export 
sophistication observed in 11 of 29 countries for which data are available in both years. 
(iv) Product discovery is found to be above the average for developing countries in a number of 
African countries (Egypt and Uganda being the most prominent examples). For the majority of 
countries however, rates of product discovery are somewhat below the developing country 
average, being less than 50 (compared to an average for developing countries of around 80) in 16 
of 31 countries for which we have data. 
(v) Overall the results suggest that a minority of African countries have been able to upgrade 
according to a number of the indicators of upgrading considered (prominent examples including 
Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia). Despite some evidence of upgrading across particular dimensions 
however, for most African countries we observe that the extent of upgrading tends to be lower 
than that for the average developing country. 
 
4. GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INNOVATION IN AFRICA 
Identifying a role for GVC involvement on innovation and technology production is a difficult 
task even in the case of developed countries. A number of existing studies attempt this however 
in a developed country context, examples including Görg and Hanley (2011) for Ireland, 
Cusmano et al (2008) for Italy, Bloom et al. (2011) for 12 advanced countries and Arvantis and 
Loukis (2012) for Switzerland and Greece. Studies on offshoring and innovation outside of 
developed countries are scarcer, though a number of studies examine the relationship between 
importing and innovative activities (examples including Goldberg et al (2010) for India, and 
Gorodnichenko et al (2010), Correa et al (2010) and Crino (2012) for a set of emerging 
economies). Fritsch and Görg (2013) also concentrate on firms from a set of 20 emerging 
economies, but use questions from the survey more directly related to the concept of offshoring. 
They find that the effect of offshoring is positive and significantly larger than the effect of 
domestic outsourcing on R&D spending. 
In a developing country context – and in Africa in particular – this task is even more difficult 
given the paucity of available data, particularly at the sectoral level where much of the analysis of 
GVCs takes place. A common proxy variable is a measure of R&D expenditure, considered to 
be the major input into innovative activities. While there are some data reported on R&D 
expenditures for African countries (UNESCO for example reports data on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP for a large sample of countries, including some from Africa), data at the sectoral level is 
severely limited. In 2010, the first African Innovation Outlook was published, which reports a 
number of relevant indicators of innovation for African countries based on survey data. While a 
step forward, this publication only splits R&D spending into business, government, higher 
education and private non-profit institutions, with no industry split reported. A second popular 
proxy for innovation and technological output are patent counts, with concordances now 
available to provide a mapping from the technology classes that patents are reported in to 
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common industry classifications (see for example Lybbert and Zolas, 2012). Again however, 
while simple aggregate patent counts are available for many African countries from a number of 
sources (e.g. the World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO), data is sparse for African 
countries at the technology class level.  
Given the lack of sectoral data on R&D and patenting, along with the perceived weaknesses of 
these proxies, increasingly researchers are turning to (firm-level) innovation surveys to answer 
questions related to innovation and other aspects of firm behaviour and performance. These 
surveys have a number of advantages, in that they allow for a more accurate description of actual 
(product and process) innovations. In an African context a number of surveys (e.g. World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, UNIDO’s Africa Investor Survey) ask questions on whether firms have 
introduced new products or processes and other innovation related questions. Unfortunately, in 
the case of African countries the questions on innovation are often not asked, and even when 
they are sample sizes are often too small to do any meaningful analysis at the sectoral level. A 
further issue for the current paper is that the questions on innovation are often not related to 
relevant questions on the importance and role of GVCs for the firms being surveyed, particularly 
in Africa. Fritsch and Görg (2013) use information on whether firms have outsourced products 
or services in the past three years and on the share of foreign material inputs in total material 
inputs for their sample of emerging economies using the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPs) dataset. These questions have rarely been asked in an African 
context. Moreover, there is a lack of firm-level panel data for African countries, the presence of 
which could help reduce problems of endogeneity and allow studies to address issues of causality 
between innovation and GVCs in addition to simple correlation.20 A useful step in understanding 
the relationship between innovation and GVCs in a developing country context – and in 
particular in Africa – will be to develop existing firm-level surveys into panel datasets that 
provide information on a firm’s innovation profile and activities and its internationalisation 
strategies, something achieved in the recent EFIGE database of European firms for example. 
To provide some information on the relationship between GVCs and innovation in an African 
context, we use UNIDO’s Africa Investor Survey 2010, which covers around 5,000 domestic 
and foreign-owned firms in 19 African countries. Note however that only around 2,200 firms 
responded to the innovation questions from this sample of 5,000 firms. Note further that we 
only have data on the innovation question for just 29 services firms (from a total sample of over 
2,000!). In our analysis therefore we pool observations from the 19 different countries, and do 
not attempt to make any sectoral breakdown other than for broad aggregates such as 
manufacturing and services. To capture innovation using this dataset we consider responses to 
the questions asking whether the firm had introduced a new product or process innovation in 
the last three years. There is no direct question on offshoring or GVCs, so we are forced to rely 
on responses to the question of whether the firm imported any of its inputs in the last financial 
year, also reporting information on whether the firm exported any of its output in the last 
financial year.  
                                                            
20 While there exist two-period panel datasets for a handful of African countries in the set of World Bank enterprise 
surveys, they do not ask the questions on the introduction of new products/processes or the R&D questions in 
both years.  
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Table 1 reports for all 19 countries the average response to the question of whether firms 
introduced new product or process innovations in the last three years for all firms, and for 
importers and exporters separately. Results are reported for manufacturing firms, services firms, 
agriculture and mining firms, and electricity, water and construction firms separately. The table 
indicates that around 32% of firms that responded to the innovation question introduced new 
products in the last three years. These figures are somewhat larger for importers (36%) and in 
particular for exporters (47%). A lower percentage introduced new processes (22%), with the 
figures for importers again being slightly higher (25%) and those for exporters higher still (32%). 
For manufacturing firms only the averages are generally higher, though the pattern is similar with 
averages for importers being somewhat larger than for all firms and those for exporters being the 
largest. Results for services are somewhat different. Averages in the case of services are generally 
lower, with the values being highest for importers, with exporters having an average that is lower 
than for all firms. It should be borne in mind that averages for services firms are based upon a 
particularly small sample. In the case of agriculture and mining we find that around 20% of firms 
introduced new products and 16% new processes, with importers and particularly exporters 
tending to have higher rates of product and to a lesser extent process innovation. Finally, for 
electricity, water and construction rates of product and process innovation are relatively low (10-
12%), with generally little difference for importing and exporting firms. 
To consider whether these differences are significant we report in tables 2 and 3 results of mean 
comparison tests, with Table 2 reporting results for importers versus non-importers and Table 1 
exporters versus non-exporters.21 To allow for the fact that some sectors are more likely to 
innovate than others we first demean the new product and process variables by ISIC two-digit 
sector before conducting the mean comparison tests. The mean values reported in tables 2 and 3 
are therefore the mean values by type of firm after the sector demeaning has taken place. Results 
in Table 2 indicate that there are significant differences in the propensity to introduce product 
and process innovations for all firms and for manufacturing firms, with this difference favouring 
importers. No significant differences are found for the other sectors, neither for product nor 
process innovations, though the average values tend to be higher for importers than for non-
importers. In the case of exporters versus non-exporters we find in Table 3 that there is a 
significant difference in the propensity to introduce product innovations for all firms and for all 
sectors except electricity, water and construction, with this difference favouring exporters. In the 
case of process innovations we observe significant differences in the case of all and 
manufacturing firms only. 
While not implying causality, the results from these latter three tables suggest, in the case of 
manufacturing firms at least, that importing and exporting firms are more likely to introduce 
                                                            
21 We repeated this exercise using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for a sample of eight African countries 
(Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Given differences in 
the questionnaires – in particular related to sector – we did not distinguish between or demean by sector. Results 
indicate that there are no significant differences in the average propensity to introduce new products between 
exporters and non-exporters, but that there are significant differences between exporters and non-exporters with 
respect to undertaking R&D. Results also indicate a significant difference in the propensity to undertake R&D and 
introduce new products between firms that use inputs of a foreign origin in production and those that don’t. Results 
are thus quite similar to those using the UNIDO survey data. 
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product and process innovations. While the results only relate to the distinction between firms 
that are involved in international transactions and those that are not, in the case of importers we 
may think of the observed differences as being related to GVCs, since the question is interested 
in imports of (intermediate) inputs. In the case of exporters, this category also includes exporters 
of final goods, which may not be related to GVCs. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for New Product and Process Innovations 
Obs. All Firms Obs. Importers Obs. Exporters
Full Sample 
Product 2166 0.319 1093 0.364 494 0.466 
Process 2159 0.222 1088 0.250 489 0.323 
Manufacturing Firms 
Product 1813 0.350 929 0.400 426 0.493 
Process 1804 0.242 923 0.271 421 0.347 
Services Firms 
Product 29 0.207 14 0.214 24 0.125 
Process 29 0.069 14 0.071 24 0.042 
         
Agriculture and Mining       
Product 123 0.203  50 0.260  52 0.288 
Process 124 0.161  50 0.180  52 0.192 
         
Electricity, Water and Construction       
Product 201 0.124  100 0.100  190 0.121 
Process 202 0.104  101 0.119  191 0.105 
Notes: Obs. refers to the number of observations. This table reports the mean values of the response to 
the question of whether firms introduced new product or process innovations in the last three years (1 = 
yes; 0 = no).  
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Table 2: Mean Comparison Tests for Importers versus Non-Importers 
Mean 
Importers Non-Importers t-statistic p-value 
All Firms 
Product 0.034 -0.035 -3.552 0.000*** 
Process 0.025 -0.025 -2.846 0.004*** 
Manufacturing Firms 
Product 0.040 -0.042 -3.717 0.000*** 
Process 0.027 -0.028 -2.712 0.007*** 
Services Firms 
Product -0.021 0.020 0.324 0.748 
Process 0.036 -0.033 -1.415 0.168 
Agriculture and Mining 
Product 0.061 -0.042 -1.440 0.152 
Process 0.012 -0.008 -0.309 0.758 
Electricity, Water and Construction 
Product -0.025 0.025 1.072 0.285 
Process 0.014 -0.014 -0.670 0.503 
Notes: This table reports the mean values of the response to the question of whether firms introduced 
new product or process innovations in the last three years for all firms and for importers (demeaned by 
sector), along with the t-statistic of a test of significant differences in the two means and associated p-
value.  
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Table 3: Mean Comparison Tests for Exporter versus Non-Exporters 
Mean 
Exporters Non-Exporters t-statistic p-value 
All Firms 
Product 0.126 -0.037 -7.129 0.000*** 
Process 0.093 -0.027 -5.759 0.000*** 
Manufacturing Firms 
Product 0.133 -0.041 -6.744 0.000*** 
Process 0.105 -0.032 -5.842 0.000*** 
Services Firms 
Product 0.240 -0.050 -1.815 0.081* 
Process 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Agriculture and Mining 
Product 0.079 -0.058 -1.938 0.055* 
Process 0.028 -0.020 -0.724 0.470 
Electricity, Water and Construction 
Product 0.043 -0.003 -0.448 0.655 
Process -0.017 0.001 0.186 0.853 
Notes: This table reports the mean values of the response to the question of whether firms introduced 
new product or process innovations in the last three years for all firms and for exporters (demeaned by 
sector), along with the t-statistic of a test of significant differences in the two means and associated p-
value.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Production increasingly takes place within Global Value Chains. For Africa there are potential 
benefits from this related to the fact that African countries no longer have to build up an entire 
industry in order to be competitive in international markets. Instead, it is possible to identify 
particular stages of a GVC within a sector and use policy in an effort to get a foothold in these 
stages of production. The major risk of such an approach is that African countries become stuck 
in low value-added stages of production where the opportunities for upgrading and technology 
diffusion are limited. This paper considers the extent of GVC participation by African countries 
and considers whether there is any evidence of upgrading or lock-in for African countries.  
The descriptive analysis in the paper indicates a number of important facts. According to 
popular measures of GVC participation we observe that Africa is heavily involved in GVCs. This 
conclusion hides a number of other considerations however. Africa’s participation in GVCs is 
currently largely limited to upstage production. While upstage production may involve high 
value-added activities, such as innovation and the production of knowledge assets, in the case of 
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developing countries – and Africa in particular – upstream production is associated with low 
value-added primary production, where possibilities for learning and upgrading are likely to be 
more limited. Exports of primary products dominate the intermediate exports of most African 
countries, with potential implications for upgrading. There are cases where individual African 
countries have been able to position themselves downstream within GVCs. The indicators of 
GVC participation used are based upon shares of imported and exported value-added in total 
exports and thus neglect the size of such flows however. It remains the case that Africa as a 
whole trades relatively little compared with other regions, with trade in intermediate goods in 
particular being low relative to other regions. The implication of this is that the ratios of GVC 
participation may overstate the importance of GVCs for Africa.  
In terms of the evidence in favour of upgrading, levels of export sophistication and product 
discovery that are intended to capture the extent of upgrading within GVCs tend to be lower for 
Africa than for other developing regions, suggesting that the performance of African countries in 
terms of upgrading has been weaker than in other regions. Despite this, developments in these 
indicators over time suggest that progress in terms of upgrading has been made across a broad 
range of African countries. Moreover, results suggest that countries in Africa have been able to 
export their products at higher prices while maintaining market shares, suggesting economic 
upgrading along this dimension.  
The analysis in the paper further indicates that participation in GVCs across African countries is 
highly heterogeneous. While the overall evidence tends to suggest that for Africa as a whole 
GVC participation and the extent of upgrading tends to be limited (and limited to upstream 
production in particular), there are a number of relatively successful cases where GVC 
involvement is greater.  Some African countries have been able to move into downstream 
production within GVCs, acting as assembly hubs for motor vehicles and other manufacturing 
output. In addition to reporting higher downstream GVC activity, these countries also report 
relatively large exports of parts and components and some of the highest shares of exports of 
high-tech products. The possibility for knowledge and technology spillovers and for upgrading 
across all dimensions mentioned in the text would appear to be larger for these countries. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table A1: Eora Sectors 
Sector Number Short Name Type
1 Agriculture Primary
2 Fishing Primary
3 Mining and Quarrying Primary
4 Food and Beverages Low-Tech Manufacturing 
5 Textiles and Apparel Low-Tech Manufacturing 
6 Wood and Paper Low-Tech Manufacturing 
7 Petroleum and Chemicals High-Tech Manufacturing 
8 Metal Products Low-Tech Manufacturing 
9 Electrical and Machinery High-Tech Manufacturing 
10 Transport Equipment High-Tech Manufacturing 
11 Other Manufacturing Low-Tech Manufacturing 
12 Recycling Low-Tech Manufacturing 
13 Electricity, Gas and Water Low-Tech Services 
14 Construction Low-Tech Services 
15 Maintenance and Repairs Low-Tech Services 
16 Wholesale Trade Low-Tech Services 
17 Retail Trade Low-Tech Services 
18 Hotels and Restaurants Low-Tech Services 
19 Transport Low-Tech Services 
20 Post and Telecommunications High-Tech Services 
21 Financial Intermediation High-Tech Services 
22 Public Administration High-Tech Services 
23 Education, Health and Other Services High-Tech Services 
24 Private Households Low-Tech Services 
25 Others Low-Tech Services 
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Table A2: Classification of BEC by Usage  
BEC  Categories 
Capital goods 41* Capital goods (except transport equipment)
 521* Transport equipment, industrial
  
Intermediate goods 111* Food and beverages, primary, mainly for industry
 121* Food and beverages, processed, mainly for industry
 21* Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified, primary
 22* Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified, processed
 31* Fuels and lubricants, primary
 
 322* Fuels and lubricants, processed (other than motor spirit) 
 42* Parts and accessories of capital goods (except transport equipment) 
 53* Parts and accessories of transport equipment
 
  
Consumption goods 112* Food and beverages, primary, mainly for household consumption 
 122* Food and beverages, processed, mainly for household consumption 
 522* Transport equipment, non-industrial
 61* Consumer goods not elsewhere specified, durable
 62* Consumer goods not elsewhere specified, semi-durable
 63* Consumer goods not elsewhere specified, non-durable
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Country Coverage 
Developed Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
New Zealand 
Portugal 
San Marino 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United Kingdom 
USA 
African Countries 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
East and South-East 
Asia 
Brunei 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 
Laos 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
China 
Hong Kong 
Macao 
North Korea 
Mongolia 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Central America 
Costa Rica  
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Belize 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
South America 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Guyana 
Suriname 
Uruguay 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Ecuador 
Venezuela 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
 
Caribbean 
Antigua 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Bermuda 
Cayman Islands 
Cuba 
British Virgin Islands 
Jamaica 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Netherlands Antilles 
Transition Countries 
Albania 
Belarus 
Croatia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Serbia 
Montenegro 
Former USSR 
TFYR Macedonia 
Western Asia 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Georgia 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Turkey 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen 
Iran 
Gaza Strip 
      
 
  
77 
 
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON PRODUCT DISCOVERY 
Alternative Measures of Product Discovery 
Results for product discovery are quite sensitive to the measure used. Results using the liberal 
measure (Figure A1) report much higher values for Africa, for transition countries and in 
particular for the Caribbean which reported the lowest values according to the conservative 
measure. Results using the moderate measure (Figure A2) are similar to those using the liberal 
measure, with Africa ranked second in terms of product discovery rates behind transition 
countries, with West and South Asia also reporting relatively high rates.  
Figure A1: Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Liberal Measure) 
 
 
  
0
50
0
1,
00
0
1,
50
0
2,
00
0
A
ll
A
dv
an
ce
d
U
SA E
U
Ja
pa
n
D
ev
el
op
in
g
A
fri
ca
A
si
a
E
as
tS
ou
th
ea
st
A
si
a
S
ou
th
A
si
a
W
es
te
rn
A
si
a
La
tin
A
m
er
ic
a
C
en
tra
lA
m
er
ic
a
C
ar
ib
be
an
S
ou
th
A
m
er
ic
a
Tr
an
si
tio
nC
ou
nt
rie
s
78 
 
Figure A2: Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Moderate Measure) 
 
At the level of the individual African country using the liberal measure leads to a number of 
changes when compared with the conservative measure, with Mozambique and Ghana joining 
Egypt, Uganda and Zambia with the highest rates of product discovery. These results are 
repeated using the moderate measure of product discovery (Figure A4). 
Figure A3: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Liberal Measure) 
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Figure A4: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Moderate Measure) 
 
 
Types of Product Discovery 
Finally, we report in Figures A5 and A6 the results of splitting up product discovery by BEC 
code for individual regions using the liberal and moderate measures respectively, and in Figures 
A7 and A8 similar results for the 2000s for individual African countries. Figures A5 and A6 
confirm earlier results indicating that Africa has a relatively low share of product discovery in 
intermediate goods, and a relatively large share in consumption goods.  
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Figure A5: Types of Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Liberal Measure) 
 
Figure A6: Types of Product Discovery by Region, 2000s (Moderate Measure) 
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Figure A7: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Liberal Measure) 
 
Figure A8: Product Discovery by African Country, 2000s (Moderate Measure) 
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APPENDIX C: RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE INDICATOR OF GVCS 
Timmer et al (2014) and Los et al (2015) propose an alternative indicator of GVC participation 
to describe the international fragmentation of specific value chains. The method is quite similar 
to that described above (i.e. Koopman et al, 2011) but replaces the export vector with the final 
output vector. A value chain of final products, ܏, is identified by the last stage of production, 
with the vector of value-added created in each of the ܵܰ country-industries involved in a value 
chain being given by: 
܏ ൌ ܞሺ۷ െ ۯሻିଵ۴ 
where ܵ denotes industries, ܰ denotes countries, ܞ is a diagonalised vector of value-added over 
gross output ratios, ሺ۷ െ ۯሻିଵ is the Leontief inverse, and ۴ is the diagonalised final output 
vector that determines which value chain is considered. In our analysis, ۴ consists of: (i) 
Household final consumption; (ii) Non-profit institutions serving households; (iii) Government 
final consumption; Gross fixed capital formation; (iv) Changes in inventories; (v) Acquisitions 
less disposals of valuables.  
Los et al (2015) then decompose the value-added of a final product (i.e. value chain) into value-
added contributions in any country in the world. In particular, they split the value into a 
domestic and a foreign component, but also by region. Timmer et al (2014) take an alternative 
approach and in turn replace the value-added to gross output ratio vector with the ratio to gross 
output of value-added by capital and by labour to split up the contributions into the capital and 
labour components, again further splitting into a domestic and foreign component. In our 
analysis, we consider any aspect of value-added not due to labour to be due to capital. As such, 
the value-added of labour is given by the Compensation of Employees, while the value-added of 
capital is given by: (i) Taxes on production; (ii) Subsidies on production; (iii) Net operating 
surplus; (iv) Net mixed income; and (v) Consumption of fixed capital. 
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Figure A9: Value of Value Chain in 2010 by Region 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure A9 reports the average value-added of the value chain across countries and sectors within 
each of nine regions in 2010. Africa as a region has a relatively small average value-added in value 
chains, being larger than Transition countries only. Values are, as expected, considerably higher 
in the EU, the USA and Japan, as well as East and South-East Asia, Other Asia and Latin 
America. Figure A9 also reports the average foreign value-added share by region for 2010. Here 
we observe that Africa has a higher foreign value-added share than both Japan and the USA, 
with a share similar to that in Latin America. Shares in Africa are somewhat smaller than values 
found in the EU, Other Asia, and Transition countries, and considerably lower than the share in 
East and South-East Asia. Overall, the pattern of outcomes in Figure A9 corresponds quite 
closely with that in the main text, with the major exception being that the USA has a relatively 
larger involvement in GVCs when measured using final demand rather than exports. 
For each aggregated region and each sector, Figure A10 reports the foreign value-added share in 
final demand in 1995 and 2011. The figure indicates that there has been a tendency for the 
foreign value-added shares of final demand to increase over time in all regions. The exception to 
this is the case of Japan, where we see the vast majority of observations below the 45 degree line, 
indicating a declining share of foreign value-added. In the case of Africa there has been a strong 
tendency for fragmentation to increase. The fitted line of a regression of 1995 and 2010 shares 
for Africa reveals a coefficient of around 1.32, indicating that foreign value-added shares 
increased by around 32% over 15 years. 
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Figure A10: Foreign Value-added Shares in Output of Final Goods (1995 and 2011) 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure A11 reports the values of value-added in value chains by sector for Africa as a whole in 
2010, further split into domestic and foreign, and capital and labour contributions. The first 
thing to note from this figure is that the use of the final demand vector in place of the gross 
export vector has a big influence on the values of GVCs reported, with Mining and Quarrying 
becoming relatively unimportant and Construction, Retail Trade, Food and Beverages, amongst 
others becoming relatively more important. The other thing to note is that the foreign value-
added contribution tends to be relatively small. This is confirmed by Table A3, which reports the 
foreign value-added shares by sector for 1995 and 2010. The minimum share in 2010 was 4.4% 
in Financial Intermediation, with the maximum being 37% in Transport Equipment. The 
unweighted average was around 15%, which is not dissimilar to the value of the downstream 
measure of GVCs for Africa found using the Koopman et al (2011) approach in the main text.  
Figure A12 considers the changes in value-added in value chains over time for Africa. The figure 
shows that the value-added in value chains declined over time for 13 of the 25 sectors in Africa, 
with the declines being particularly large in Mining and Quarrying; Financial Intermediation; 
Public Administration; and Education, Health and Other Services. Where declines have occurred 
they tend to be due to declines in the value-added contributions of domestic labour and capital, 
with increases in foreign capital and labour tending to be the norm. The exception to this is the 
case of Mining and Quarrying where declines in foreign labour and capital were also observed. 
Given these changes, it is unsurprising to find (from Table A3) that the foreign value-added 
shares increased between 1995 and 2010 for all sectors, with the (unweighted) average increase 
being 3.8 percentage points. While the largest (smallest) percentage point changes occurred for 
Transport Equipment (Financial Intermediation) with changes of 9.3 (1.4) percentage points, the 
largest percentage changes in foreign value-added were in Wholesale Trade (59%). 
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Figure A11: VCs in Africa by Sector and Factor in 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure A12: Change in VC by Sector and Factor, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Table A3: Foreign Value-added Shares in Final Demand by Sector in Africa 
Sector Foreign Value-added Share Final Demand 
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1995 2010 Change  1995-2010 
in 2010
Agriculture 0.077582 0.10268 0.02510 25400000 
Fishing 0.117223 0.14174 0.02452 1758070 
Mining and Quarrying 0.130159 0.15071 0.02055 2878204 
Food and Beverages 0.117838 0.16013 0.04229 88200000 
Textiles and Apparel 0.180005 0.21475 0.03475 24600000 
Wood and Paper 0.148770 0.20205 0.05328 7533286 
Petroleum and Chemicals 0.181208 0.22973 0.04852 39000000 
Metal Products 0.171669 0.23541 0.06374 4993287 
Electrical and Machinery 0.195233 0.26317 0.06794 72100000 
Transport Equipment 0.279230 0.37202 0.09279 49100000 
Other Manufacturing 0.174754 0.23174 0.05699 14400000 
Recycling 0.151991 0.19883 0.04684 7643386 
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.081264 0.10277 0.02151 23600000 
Construction 0.116409 0.15762 0.04121 132000000 
Maintenance and Repairs 0.089845 0.12253 0.03268 3800767 
Wholesale Trade 0.064007 0.10203 0.03802 59500000 
Retail Trade 0.048061 0.06919 0.02113 101000000 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.072468 0.10403 0.03156 70400000 
Transport 0.105409 0.15022 0.04481 49400000 
Post and Telecommunications 0.065027 0.08915 0.02412 44500000 
Financial Intermediation 0.030755 0.04441 0.01366 318000000 
Public Administration 0.080177 0.11035 0.03017 226000000 
Education, Health and Other Services 0.054245 0.07593 0.02168 225000000 
Private Households 0.111758 0.14348 0.03172 3023271 
Others 0.066455 0.08840 0.02195 18100000 
Notes: values of final demand are in 1000s of US dollars.  
 
Considering the value of foreign value-added across sectors in Africa (Figure A13) we observe 
that FVA tends to be relatively large in Public Administration, as well as a number of other 
sectors including Construction; Electrical Machinery; and Transport Equipment. Splitting FVA 
into the labour and capital contributions, we find that contributions tend to be split fairly evenly 
between the two sources of value-added. The labour contribution ranges from a low of 47 to a 
high of 55%, with an (unweighted) average of 50.7%.   
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Figure A13: FVA by Sector and Factor in 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure A14 reports the value of the value chain for each African country, obtained by summing 
the domestic and foreign value-added across the 25 sectors for each African country. The first 
thing to note from this figure is that the value of the value chain is relatively small for the vast 
majority of countries, reflecting their relatively small size. This further confirms the statement 
made in the main report that using the Koopman et al (2011) approach of taking values of GVC 
participation relative to total exports may overinflate the importance of GVCs for Africa. 
Countries such as Swaziland and Sao Tome and Principe, amongst many others, that report 
relatively large values for GVC participation using the Koopman et al (2011) approach have 
some of the smallest values for value chains when using the current approach and not scaling by 
exports. Relatively speaking, value chains are important for a number of countries using this 
approach, including South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco and Libya.  
The share of FVA in the value chain tends to be relatively small (again, around 15%), being 
below 10% in a number of cases (and lowest for Somalia at just 2.8%) (see also Figure A15). The 
largest value for FVA is reported in Ethiopia, with a share of 41.8%, with shares of 30% or more 
also reported in Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland. Results in Figure A15 suggest 
that the split between labour and capital in terms of FVA tends to be fairly even across African 
countries. Indeed, the (unweighted) average contribution of labour is 50%, with the values 
ranging from 46.7% to 55.0%.  
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Figure A14: VCs by African Country, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Figure A15: Breakdown of the Value of VC by African Country, 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Finally, we consider the regional breakdown of value chain involvement for Africa. Figure A16 
reports the average values of foreign value-added by sector for Africa as a whole, but split by 
region of origin. The EU dominates as a source of FVA across most sectors, with an average 
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value of 49% across all sectors (and a minimum of 35% for Maintenance and Repairs and 58% 
for Transport Equipment). Other African countries make up 10% of an African country’s 
foreign value-added on average (a low of 5% for Others and a high of 15% for Hotels and 
Restaurants), with East and South-East Asia contributing 8.9% (a high of 13.5% for Textiles and 
Apparel), the USA 8.4% (a high of 15% for Wholesale Trade) and Japan 8.2% (a high of 18.2% 
for Wholesale Trade).  
 
Figure A16: Regional Breakdown of FVA in 2010 
 
Source: Calculations based on UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
 
Summary: 
 The average value of a value chain in Africa is dwarfed by that of most other regions.  
 Foreign value-added within African value chains makes up between 10% and 15% of the 
overall value of the value chain, a share that is not dissimilar from many other regions 
and higher than that in the USA and Japan. 
 Foreign value-added shares in African value chains have risen over time, increasing by 
around 30% between 1995 and 2010. 
 Value chains in Africa tend to be relatively large (on average) in a number of services 
sectors (e.g. public administration, financial intermediation, and education, health and 
other services), as well as food and beverages, and construction.  
 The value-added in value chains in African declined in about half of sectors between 
1995 and 2010, with these declines driven by declines in the domestic component of 
value-added.  
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 The average value of a value chain in most African countries is relatively small, with 
exceptions being South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco and Libya. 
 The EU is the dominant source of foreign value-added across Africa as a whole. 
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